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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
To: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>, Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
	Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>,
	Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	"Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2014 19:55:30 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140320025530.GA25469@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1395256011-2423-1-git-send-email-dh.herrmann@gmail.com>

On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 08:06:45PM +0100, David Herrmann wrote:
> Hi
> 
> This series introduces the concept of "file sealing". Sealing a file restricts
> the set of allowed operations on the file in question. Multiple seals are
> defined and each seal will cause a different set of operations to return EPERM
> if it is set. The following seals are introduced:
> 
>  * SEAL_SHRINK: If set, the inode size cannot be reduced
>  * SEAL_GROW: If set, the inode size cannot be increased
>  * SEAL_WRITE: If set, the file content cannot be modified
> 
> Unlike existing techniques that provide similar protection, sealing allows
> file-sharing without any trust-relationship. This is enforced by rejecting seal
> modifications if you don't own an exclusive reference to the given file. So if
> you own a file-descriptor, you can be sure that no-one besides you can modify
> the seals on the given file. This allows mapping shared files from untrusted
> parties without the fear of the file getting truncated or modified by an
> attacker.
> 
> Several use-cases exist that could make great use of sealing:
> 
>   1) Graphics Compositors
>      If a graphics client creates a memory-backed render-buffer and passes a
>      file-decsriptor to it to the graphics server for display, the server
>      _has_ to setup SIGBUS handlers whenever mapping the given file. Otherwise,
>      the client might run ftruncate() or O_TRUNC on the on file in parallel,
>      thus crashing the server.
>      With sealing, a compositor can reject any incoming file-descriptor that
>      does _not_ have SEAL_SHRINK set. This way, any memory-mappings are
>      guaranteed to stay accessible. Furthermore, we still allow clients to
>      increase the buffer-size in case they want to resize the render-buffer for
>      the next frame. We also allow parallel writes so the client can render new
>      frames into the same buffer (client is responsible of never rendering into
>      a front-buffer if you want to avoid artifacts).
> 
>      Real use-case: Wayland wl_shm buffers can be transparently converted

Very nice, the Enlightenment developers have been asking for something
like this for a while, it should help them out a lot as well.

And thanks for the man pages and test code, if only all new apis came
with that already...

greg k-h

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-03-20  2:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-03-19 19:06 [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/6] fs: fix i_writecount on shmem and friends David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 2/6] shm: add sealing API David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 3/6] shm: add memfd_create() syscall David Herrmann
2014-03-20  8:47   ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-03-20  9:01     ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 11:29       ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:50         ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 19:22   ` John Stultz
2014-04-02 13:38   ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 14:18     ` David Herrmann
2014-04-02 14:52       ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-10 19:07     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 4/6] selftests: add memfd_create() + sealing tests David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 5/6] fcntl.2: document SHMEM_SET/GET_SEALS commands David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 6/6] memfd_create.2: add memfd_create() man-page David Herrmann
2014-03-20  2:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2014-03-20  3:49 ` [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() Linus Torvalds
2014-03-20  8:07   ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 14:41     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:12       ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:26         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:32 ` tytso
2014-03-20 15:39   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:48   ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 16:38     ` tytso
2014-04-10 19:14       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:32         ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-04-10 20:37           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:49             ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 21:16               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 22:57                 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:05                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 23:16                     ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:32                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-20 15:03             ` Pavel Machek
2014-06-17  9:48             ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 16:21               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 14:45   ` Colin Walters
2014-04-10 19:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:45       ` Colin Walters
2014-04-11  6:09         ` Alex Elsayed
2014-04-08 13:00 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-09 21:31   ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22  9:10     ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 11:55       ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 12:44         ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 12:55           ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 19:17   ` Andy Lutomirski

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