linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
To: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>,
	Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, lsf-pc@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [Lsf-pc] [LSF/MM ATTEND] Richacls
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2015 13:20:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150113212059.GF29564@samba2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150113211612.GD4156@fieldses.org>

On Tue, Jan 13, 2015 at 04:16:13PM -0500, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> 
> Right, but look at the case above carefully again--it's *much* more
> special than the one the container people hit.
> 
> You can absolutely still represent weird modes like 026 with a Richacl
> and it will deny permissions in the traditional way.
> 
> What you can't do is represent the above POSIX ACL.
> 
> This is a case that you can *only* hit with POSIX ACLs (not with mode
> bits).  And that's because the POSIX ACL is doing something bizarre and
> useless that I've never seen any other ACL system do (denying read and
> write together when each would be permitted separately).
> 
> Using the usual "if a tree fell in a forest and nobody heard it..."
> criterion, I think this change would be unlikely to cause us trouble.

Agreed. I scratched my head and simply couln't think of a
case where this could affect security of the system - only
backwards bug compatibility.

  reply	other threads:[~2015-01-13 21:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <1626890778.1513173.1421087867777.JavaMail.zimbra@redhat.com>
2015-01-12 21:06 ` [LSF/MM ATTEND] Richacls Andreas Gruenbacher
2015-01-12 21:54   ` Jeremy Allison
2015-01-12 22:30   ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-01-13 10:14     ` [Lsf-pc] " Jan Kara
2015-01-13 15:07       ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2015-01-13 16:48         ` Jeremy Allison
2015-01-13 17:23           ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2015-01-13 17:29             ` Jeremy Allison
2015-01-13 17:40             ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-01-13 18:04               ` Jeremy Allison
2015-01-13 19:53                 ` Frank Filz
2015-01-13 20:24                   ` 'J. Bruce Fields'
2015-01-13 20:26                   ` Jeremy Allison
2015-01-13 20:30                     ` Jeremy Allison
2015-01-13 20:35                       ` Frank Filz
2015-01-14  7:57                   ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2015-01-13 21:04               ` Jan Kara
2015-01-13 21:16                 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-01-13 21:20                   ` Jeremy Allison [this message]
2015-01-13 21:27                     ` Frank Filz
2015-01-13 21:31                   ` Jan Kara
2015-01-14  8:53                     ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2015-01-14 12:01                       ` Jeff Layton
2015-01-14 16:11                         ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-01-14 17:21                           ` Frank Filz
2015-01-23  5:31   ` Steve French

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20150113212059.GF29564@samba2 \
    --to=jra@samba.org \
    --cc=agruenba@redhat.com \
    --cc=bfields@fieldses.org \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lsf-pc@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).