From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [CFT][PATCH 00/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts (take 2)
Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 16:04:38 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150528210438.GA14849@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87lhg8pwvz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 10:03:28AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> writes:
>
> > Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@amacapital.net):
> >> On Fri, May 22, 2015 at 10:39 AM, Eric W. Biederman
> >> <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> >> > I had hoped to get some Tested-By's on that patch series.
> >>
> >> Sorry, I've been totally swamped.
> >>
> >> I suspect that Sandstorm is okay, but I haven't had a chance to test
> >> it for real. Sandstorm makes only limited use of proc and sysfs in
> >> containers, but I'll see if I can test it for real this weekend.
> >
> > Testing this with unprivileged containers, I get
> >
> > lxc-start: conf.c: lxc_mount_auto_mounts: 808 Operation not permitted
> > - error mounting sysfs on
> > /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/sys/devices/virtual/net flags 0
>
> Grr.. I was afraid this would break something. :(
>
> Looking at my system I see that sysfs is currently mounted
> "nosuid,nodev,noexec"
>
> Looking at the lxc-start code I don't see it as including any of those
> mount options. In practice for sysfs I think those options are
> meaningless (as there should be no devices and nothing executable in
> sysfs) but I can understand the past concerns with chmod on virtual
> filesystems that would incline people to use them, so I think the
> failure is reporting a legitimate security issue in the lxc userspace
> code where the the unprivileged code is currently attempting to give
> greater access to sysfs than was given by the original mount of sysfs.
>
> As nosuid,nodev,noexec should not impair the operation of sysfs
> operation it looks like you can always specify those options and just
> make this concern go away.
>
> Something like the untested patch below I expect.
>
> diff --git a/src/lxc/conf.c b/src/lxc/conf.c
> index 9870455b3cae..d9ccd03afe68 100644
> --- a/src/lxc/conf.c
> +++ b/src/lxc/conf.c
> @@ -770,8 +770,8 @@ static int lxc_mount_auto_mounts(struct lxc_conf *conf, int flags, struct lxc_ha
> { LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
> { LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, NULL, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
> { LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_RW, "proc", "%r/proc", "proc", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
> - { LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RW, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", 0, NULL },
> - { LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RO, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_RDONLY, NULL },
> + { LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RW, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
> + { LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RO, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
> { LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
> { LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "%r/sys", "%r/sys", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
> { LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, NULL, "%r/sys", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
fwiw - the first one works, the second one does not due to an apparent
inability to statvfs the origin.
> Alternately you can read the flags off of the original mount of proc or sysfs.
>
> diff --git a/src/lxc/conf.c b/src/lxc/conf.c
> index 9870455b3cae..50ea49973e80 100644
> --- a/src/lxc/conf.c
> +++ b/src/lxc/conf.c
> @@ -712,7 +712,9 @@ static unsigned long add_required_remount_flags(const char *s, const char *d,
> struct statvfs sb;
> unsigned long required_flags = 0;
>
> - if (!(flags & MS_REMOUNT))
> + if (!(flags & MS_REMOUNT) &&
> + (strcmp(s, "proc") != 0) &&
> + (strcmp(s, "sysfs") != 0))
> return flags;
>
> if (!s)
>
> Eric
> _______________________________________________
> Containers mailing list
> Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-05-28 21:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-05-14 17:30 [CFT][PATCH 0/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87pp63jcca.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-14 17:31 ` [CFT][PATCH 01/10] mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:32 ` [CFT][PATCH 02/10] mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with mount attributes Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:32 ` [CFT][PATCH 03/10] vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:34 ` [CFT][PATCH 06/10] proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:34 ` [CFT][PATCH 07/10] kernfs: Add support for always " Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:35 ` [CFT][PATCH 08/10] sysfs: Add support for permanently " Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87fv6zhxkp.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-14 20:31 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
[not found] ` <20150514203131.GB16416-U8xfFu+wG4EAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-14 21:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:36 ` [CFT][PATCH 09/10] sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_empty_dir Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <878ucrhxi9.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-11 18:44 ` Tejun Heo
2015-08-11 18:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-11 19:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXE=fKa3XkEEo6y2=ZNtsuBfX=kaoyDwiP0C2BwqKJWjw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 0:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87mvxxcogp.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 20:00 ` Tejun Heo
2015-08-12 20:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87r3n82qxd.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 21:05 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <877fp1hcuj.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-11 20:11 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <CAOS58YOHU8SFv4UXeBRr4t88UU=DXQCPg2HU_dMBmgM7WBB1zQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 0:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87fv3pe3zn.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 3:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87a8txb1k8.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 4:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <871tf9b19v.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 19:15 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <20150812191515.GA4496-qYNAdHglDFBN0TnZuCh8vA@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 20:07 ` [PATCH] fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0 Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87mvxw46fc.fsf_-_-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 20:18 ` Tejun Heo
2015-05-14 17:37 ` [CFT][PATCH 10/10] mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:33 ` [CFT][PATCH 04/10] fs: Add helper functions " Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:33 ` [CFT][PATCH 05/10] sysctl: Allow creating " Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 20:29 ` [CFT][PATCH 0/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-14 21:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87oalmg90j.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-15 6:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrU1yxcDfv4YV3wVpWMAdiOOsSUFOPUpFAN-mVA4M-OxdQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-15 6:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:05 ` [CFT][PATCH 00/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts (take 2) Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:06 ` [CFT][PATCH 02/10] mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with mount attributes Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87siaxuvik.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-16 2:06 ` [CFT][PATCH 01/10] mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 03/10] vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 04/10] fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:08 ` [CFT][PATCH 05/10] sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:08 ` [CFT][PATCH 06/10] proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:09 ` [CFT][PATCH 07/10] kernfs: Add support for always empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:09 ` [CFT][PATCH 08/10] sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-18 13:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-16 2:10 ` [CFT][PATCH 09/10] sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-18 13:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-16 2:11 ` [CFT][PATCH 10/10] mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-22 17:39 ` [CFT][PATCH 00/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts (take 2) Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87wq004im1.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-22 18:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrUhXBR5WQ6gXr9KzGc4=7tph7kzopY29Hug4g+FhOzEKg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-22 20:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-28 14:08 ` Serge Hallyn
2015-05-28 15:03 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-28 17:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXXax28s9kMTQ-zDx0MttQWG4rg2y-oz3bSGiumSL=3sg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 18:20 ` Kenton Varda
[not found] ` <CAOP=4wid+N_80iyPpiVMN96_fuHZZRGtYQ6AOPn-HFBj2H6Vgg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 19:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87fv6gikfn.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 20:12 ` Kenton Varda
2015-05-28 20:47 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-05-28 21:07 ` Kenton Varda
[not found] ` <CAOP=4wiAA4SqvMn_rQJHOjg6M-75bi_G9Fx8ENgVnYdkT5WVQA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 21:12 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-05-29 0:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-29 0:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXO21Y7PR=pKqaqJb1YZArNyjAv7Z-J44O53FcfLM_0Tw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-29 4:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87fv6g80g7.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-29 4:54 ` Kenton Varda
2015-05-29 17:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-06-03 21:13 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87k2vkebri.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-03 21:15 ` [CFT][PATCH 11/10] mnt: Avoid unnecessary regressions in fs_fully_visible Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87eglseboh.fsf_-_-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-04 4:35 ` [CFT][PATCH 11/10] mnt: Avoid unnecessary regressions in fs_fully_visible (take 2) Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <874mmodral.fsf_-_-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-04 5:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-06-05 0:46 ` [CFT][PATCH 11/10] mnt: Avoid unnecessary regressions in fs_fully_visible Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrWwtFaiaYGLoq4EPkrgcq9nEA2GseVfP3iBkbYZ8NfGPg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-06 19:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-06-04 5:19 ` [CFT][PATCH 00/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts (take 2) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-06-04 6:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87h9qo6la9.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-04 7:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-06-16 12:23 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-05-28 21:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
[not found] ` <20150528210438.GA14849-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 21:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-28 21:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-05-28 19:36 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <55676E32.3050006-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 19:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-28 20:30 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <55677AEF.1090809-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 21:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87iobcfkwx.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 21:46 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <55678CCA.80807-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-16 12:30 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-05-29 9:30 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <556831CF.9040600-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-29 17:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-06-06 18:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87mw0c1x8p.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-16 12:31 ` Daniel P. Berrange
[not found] ` <20150616123148.GB18689-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-16 12:46 ` Richard Weinberger
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