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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	SELinux-NSA <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 15:40:09 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150728204009.GF83521@ubuntu-hedt> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55B02FBD.4040606@schaufler-ca.com>

On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 05:05:17PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > This is what I currently think you want for user ns mounts:
> >
> >  1. smk_root and smk_default are assigned the label of the backing
> >     device.
> >  2. s_root is assigned the transmute property.
> >  3. For existing files:
> >     a. Files with the same label as the backing device are accessible.
> >     b. Files with any other label are not accessible.
> 
> That's right. Accept correct data, reject anything that's not right.
> 
> > If this is right, there are a couple lingering questions in my mind.
> >
> > First, what happens with files created in directories with the same
> > label as the backing device but without the transmute property set? The
> > inode for the new file will initially be labeled with smk_of_current(),
> > but then during d_instantiate it will get smk_default and thus end up
> > with the label we want. So that seems okay.
> 
> Yes.
> 
> > The second is whether files with the SMACK64EXEC attribute is still a
> > problem. It seems it is, for files with the same label as the backing
> > store at least. I think we can simply skip the code that reads out this
> > xattr and sets smk_task for user ns mounts, or else skip assigning the
> > label to the new task in bprm_set_creds. The latter seems more
> > consistent with the approach you've suggested for dealing with labels
> > from disk.
> 
> Yes, I think that skipping the smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, ...) in
> smack_d_instantiate for unprivileged mounts would do the trick.
> 
> > So I guess all of that seems okay, though perhaps a bit restrictive
> > given that the user who mounted the filesystem already has full access
> > to the backing store.
> 
> In truth, there is no reason to expect that the "user" who did the
> mount will ever have a Smack label that differs from the label of
> the backing store. If what we've got here seems restrictive, it's
> because you've got access from someone other than the "user".
> 
> > Please let me know whether or not this matches up with what you are
> > thinking, then I can procede with the implementation.
> 
> My current mindset is that, if you're going to allow unprivileged
> mounts of user defined backing stores, this is as safe as we can
> make it.

All right, I've got a patch which I think does this, and I've managed to
do some testing to confirm that it behaves like I expect. How does this
look?

What's missing is getting the label from the block device inode; as
Stephen discovered the inode that I thought we could get the label from
turned out to be the wrong one. Afaict we would need a new hook in order
to do that, so for now I'm using the label of the proccess calling
mount.

---

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a143328f75eb..8e631a66b03c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -662,6 +662,8 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 		skp = smk_of_current();
 		sp->smk_root = skp;
 		sp->smk_default = skp;
+		if (sb_in_userns(sb))
+			transmute = 1;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Initialize the root inode.
@@ -1023,6 +1025,12 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (mask == 0)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (sb_in_userns(inode->i_sb)) {
+		struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+		if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
+			return -EACCES;
+	}
+
 	/* May be droppable after audit */
 	if (no_block)
 		return -ECHILD;
@@ -3220,14 +3228,16 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			if (rc >= 0)
 				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 		}
-		/*
-		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
-		 */
-		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
-		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
-		    skp == &smack_known_web)
-			skp = NULL;
-		isp->smk_task = skp;
+		if (!sb_in_userns(inode->i_sb)) {
+			/*
+			 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
+			 */
+			skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+			    skp == &smack_known_web)
+				skp = NULL;
+			isp->smk_task = skp;
+		}
 
 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
 		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-07-28 20:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 117+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-07-15 19:46 [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  2:47   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-05 21:03     ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-05 21:19       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-06 14:20         ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 14:51           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-06 15:44             ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 16:11               ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-07 14:16                 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 14:32           ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 18:35             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-07 18:57               ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 21:48   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 21:50     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-15 22:35       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  1:14         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  1:23           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 13:06             ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  1:19         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  4:23           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  4:49             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  5:04               ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  5:15                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  5:44                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:13                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17  0:43                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-29 16:04                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-29 16:18                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-07-17  6:46   ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] security: Restrict security attribute updates for userns mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] selinux: Ignore security labels on user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 13:23   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:02     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:14       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 20:25         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 20:40           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 13:57             ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 14:39               ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 15:36                 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 16:23                   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-24 15:11                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 15:57                       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-30 16:24                         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] smack: Don't use security labels for " Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 20:43   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 20:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 21:06   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-15 21:48     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 22:28       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  1:05         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  2:20           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:12           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-15 23:04       ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 22:39     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16  1:08       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  2:54         ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16  4:47           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17  0:09             ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-17  0:42               ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17  2:47                 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-21 17:37                   ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22  7:56                     ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-22 14:09                       ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 16:52                         ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-07-22 17:41                           ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23  1:51                             ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-23 13:19                               ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 23:48                                 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-18  0:07                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-20 17:54             ` Colin Walters
2015-07-16 11:16     ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-17  0:10       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 10:13         ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-16  3:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:59   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 15:09     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 18:57       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 21:42         ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 22:27           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 23:08             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 23:29               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17  0:45                 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-17  0:59                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17 14:28                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-17 14:56                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-21 20:35                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22  1:52                       ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 15:56                         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 18:10                           ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 19:32                             ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23  0:05                               ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-23  0:15                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-23  5:15                                   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 21:48                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-28 20:40                                 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-07-30 16:18                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 17:05                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 17:25                                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 17:33                                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 13:21           ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 17:14             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 15:59     ` Seth Forshee
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-07-30  4:24 Amir Goldstein
2015-07-30 13:55 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 14:47   ` Amir Goldstein
2015-07-30 15:33     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 15:52       ` Colin Walters
2015-07-30 16:15         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 13:57 ` Serge Hallyn
2015-07-30 15:09   ` Amir Goldstein
2015-07-31  8:11 Amir Goldstein
2015-07-31 19:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-01 17:01   ` Amir Goldstein

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