From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Subject: Re: [PATCH review 6/6] vfs: Cache the results of path_connected Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2015 15:45:40 -0400 Message-ID: <20150828194540.GF10468@fieldses.org> References: <874moq9oyb.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <871tfkawu9.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <8738009i0h.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20150804115215.GA317@odin.com> <871tfj0x4j.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20150804194447.GB6664@fieldses.org> <874mkey824.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20150805155948.GD17797@fieldses.org> <878u9pwvg8.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20150828194302.GE10468@fieldses.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Andrew Vagin , Linux Containers , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Al Viro , Andy Lutomirski , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Richard Weinberger , Andrey Vagin , Jann Horn , Willy Tarreau , Omar Sandoval , Miklos Szeredi , Linus Torvalds To: "Eric W. Biederman" Return-path: Received: from fieldses.org ([173.255.197.46]:46496 "EHLO fieldses.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752514AbbH1Tpk (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Aug 2015 15:45:40 -0400 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20150828194302.GE10468@fieldses.org> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 at 03:43:02PM -0400, J. Bruce Fields wrote: > On Wed, Aug 05, 2015 at 11:28:55AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > The file handle reconstitution code can certainly be affected by all of > > this. Given that it is an failure if reconnect_path can't reconnect the > > path of a file handle. I think it can reasonably considered an error in > > all cases if that path is outside of an exported bind mount, but I don't > > know that area particularly well. The solution might just be don't > > export file handles from bind mounts. > > I don't think there's any new cause for concern here. > > I'd quibble with the language "don't export filehandles", *if* by that > you mean "don't tell allow anyone to know filehandles". They're > guessable, so keeping them secret doesn't guarantee much security. > > The dangerous operation is open_by_handle, and people need to understand > that if you allow someone to call that then you're effectively giving > access to the whole filesystem. That's always been true. (We don't > really have an efficient way to determine if a non-directory is in a > given subtree anyway.) > > Such filehandle-guessing attacks on NFS have long been well-understood. > NOSUBTREECHECK can prevent them but causes other problems, so isn't the > default. > > So the basic rule I think is "don't allow lookup-by-filehandle (or NFS > export) on part of a filesystem unless you'd be willing to allow it on > the whole thing". (So in case it wasn't clear: ACK to just ignoring this, I don't think your (otherwise interesting) observations point to anything that needs fixing in the lookup-by-filehandle case.) --b.