From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>,
Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>,
dm-devel@redhat.com, Neil Brown <neilb@suse.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>, Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/5] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 01:07:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151001230700.GA10087@quack.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87wpv6a8hl.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
On Thu 01-10-15 10:55:50, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> The goal if possible is to run things like docker without needed to be
> root or even more fun to run docker in a container, and in general
> enable nested containers.
Frankly at the filesystem side we are rather far from being able to safely
mount untrusted device and I don't think we'll ever be robust enough to
tolerate e.g. user changing the disk while fs is using it. So would this be
FUSE-only thing or is someone still hoping that general purpose filesystems
will be robust enough in future?
Honza
--
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-10-01 23:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-09-30 20:15 [PATCH 0/5] User namespace mount updates Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 1/5] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 23:42 ` Mike Snitzer
2015-10-01 12:55 ` Seth Forshee
2015-10-01 13:40 ` Mike Snitzer
2015-10-01 14:41 ` Seth Forshee
2015-10-08 15:41 ` Seth Forshee
2015-10-01 15:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-10-01 23:07 ` Jan Kara [this message]
2015-10-05 14:26 ` Seth Forshee
2015-10-01 15:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-10-01 15:55 ` Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 2/5] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 4/5] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 5/5] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
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