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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 7/7] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 14:24:04 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151015192404.GC31612@ubuntu-hedt> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <561F3DC7.4070901@schaufler-ca.com>

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 10:46:47PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 10/13/2015 10:04 AM, Seth Forshee wrote:
> > The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
> > differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
> > potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
> > way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
> > from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
> > access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
> > consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
> > smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
> > with the label supplied in the xattr.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> 
> Aside from the one comment below (which I can be talked out of)
> this looks fine.
> 
> > ---
> >  security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
> >  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> > index 621200f86b56..bee0b2652bf4 100644
> > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> > @@ -891,6 +891,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> >  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
> >  	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
> >  	struct inode_smack *isp;
> > +	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
> >  	int rc;
> >  
> >  	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
> > @@ -900,6 +901,10 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> >  	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
> >  		return 0;
> >  
> > +	sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> > +	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED && isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
> 
> Call me old fashioned, but how about
> 
> 	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) && isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
> 
> naked '&'s give me the willies. 

That's fine by me.

Seth

      reply	other threads:[~2015-10-15 19:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-10-13 17:04 [PATCH v2 0/7] User namespace mount updates Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] mtd: Check permissions towards mtd " Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 20:27   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2015-10-15  5:46   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-10-15 19:24     ` Seth Forshee [this message]

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