From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2015 21:05:42 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151117210542.GY22011@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <564B9074.5030305@gmail.com>
On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 03:39:16PM -0500, Austin S Hemmelgarn wrote:
> >This is absolutely insane, no matter how much LSM snake oil you slatter on
> >the whole thing. All of a sudden you are exposing a huge attack surface
> >in the place where it would hurt most and as the consolation we are offered
> >basically "Ted is willing to fix holes when they are found".
> For the context of static image attacks, anything that's found
> _needs_ to be fixed regardless, and unless you can find some way to
> actually prevent attacks on mounted filesystems that doesn't involve
> a complete re-write of the filesystem drivers, then there's not much
> we can do about it. Yes, unprivileged mounts expose an attack
> surface, but so does userspace access to the network stack, and so
> do a lot of other features that are considered essential in a modern
> general purpose operating system.
"X is exposes an attack surface. Y exposes a diferent attack surface.
Y is considered important. Therefore X is important enough to implement it"
Right...
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-17 21:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-17 16:39 [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] mtd: Check permissions towards mtd " Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 0:00 ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 0:02 ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 0:03 ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 18:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-11-18 0:12 ` James Morris
2015-11-18 0:50 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 17:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates Al Viro
2015-11-17 17:25 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 17:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-17 17:55 ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 18:34 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 19:12 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-17 19:21 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 19:25 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-17 20:12 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-17 22:00 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-19 15:23 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-19 16:19 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-19 16:31 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-20 17:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-17 19:26 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-18 19:10 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-11-18 19:28 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 19:32 ` Serge Hallyn
2015-11-17 19:02 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 19:16 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 20:54 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 21:32 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 12:23 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 14:22 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 14:58 ` Al Viro
2015-11-18 15:05 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 15:13 ` Al Viro
2015-11-18 15:19 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 7:47 ` James Morris
2015-11-19 7:53 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 14:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-19 15:04 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 14:37 ` Colin Walters
2015-11-19 14:49 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 15:17 ` Richard W.M. Jones
2015-11-19 14:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-18 15:34 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 15:36 ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-11-17 19:30 ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 20:39 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 21:05 ` Al Viro [this message]
2015-11-17 22:01 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 12:46 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 14:30 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 15:38 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
[not found] ` <564C9B92.5080107-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-11-18 18:33 ` Daniel J Walsh
2015-11-18 18:44 ` J. Bruce Fields
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20151117210542.GY22011@ZenIV.linux.org.uk \
--to=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=ahferroin7@gmail.com \
--cc=dm-devel@redhat.com \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-raid@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=serge.hallyn@canonical.com \
--cc=seth.forshee@canonical.com \
--cc=tytso@mit.edu \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).