From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 09:05:12 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151118150512.GE134139@ubuntu-hedt> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20151118145818.GC22011@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 02:58:18PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 08:22:38AM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
>
> > But it still requires the admin set it up that way, no? And aren't
> > privileges required to set up those devices in the first place?
> >
> > I'm not saying that it wouldn't be a good idea to lock down the backing
> > stores for those types of devices too, just that it isn't something that
> > a regular user could exploit without an admin doing something to
> > facilitate it.
>
> Sigh... If it boils down to "all admins within all containers must be
> trusted not to try and break out" (along with "roothole in any container
> escalates to kernel-mode code execution on host"), then what the fuck
> is the *point* of bothering with containers, userns, etc. in the first
> place? If your model is basically "you want isolation, just use kvm",
> fine, but where's the place for userns in all that?
>
> And if you are talking about the _host_ admin, then WTF not have him just
> mount what's needed as part of setup and to hell with mounting those
> inside the container?
Yes, the host admin. I'm not talking about trusting the admin inside the
container at all.
>From my perspective the idea is essentially to allow mounting with fuse
or with ext4 using "mount -o loop ..." within a container.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-18 15:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-17 16:39 [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] mtd: Check permissions towards mtd " Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 0:00 ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 0:02 ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 0:03 ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 18:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-11-18 0:12 ` James Morris
2015-11-18 0:50 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 17:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates Al Viro
2015-11-17 17:25 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 17:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-17 17:55 ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 18:34 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 19:12 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-17 19:21 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 19:25 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-17 20:12 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-17 22:00 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-19 15:23 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-19 16:19 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-19 16:31 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-20 17:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-17 19:26 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-18 19:10 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-11-18 19:28 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 19:32 ` Serge Hallyn
2015-11-17 19:02 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 19:16 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 20:54 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 21:32 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 12:23 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 14:22 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 14:58 ` Al Viro
2015-11-18 15:05 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-11-18 15:13 ` Al Viro
2015-11-18 15:19 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 7:47 ` James Morris
2015-11-19 7:53 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 14:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-19 15:04 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 14:37 ` Colin Walters
2015-11-19 14:49 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 15:17 ` Richard W.M. Jones
2015-11-19 14:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-18 15:34 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 15:36 ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-11-17 19:30 ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 20:39 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 21:05 ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 22:01 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 12:46 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 14:30 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 15:38 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
[not found] ` <564C9B92.5080107-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-11-18 18:33 ` Daniel J Walsh
2015-11-18 18:44 ` J. Bruce Fields
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