From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
device-mapper development <dm-devel@redhat.com>,
"linux-raid@vger.kernel.org" <linux-raid@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org" <linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 09:23:47 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151119152347.GA45540@ubuntu-hedt> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE1zotJRp3=G2Vdud7kVbkToKe2YsTF3gXUnLCNzKV6F0oumdg@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 12:00:17AM +0200, Octavian Purdila wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 10:12 PM, Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> wrote:
> > Am 17.11.2015 um 20:25 schrieb Octavian Purdila:
> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:21 PM, Seth Forshee
> >> <seth.forshee@canonical.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 08:12:31PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> >>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 7:34 PM, Seth Forshee
> >>>> <seth.forshee@canonical.com> wrote:
> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 05:55:06PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> >>>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 11:25:51AM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Shortly after that I plan to follow with support for ext4. I've been
> >>>>>>> fuzzing ext4 for a while now and it has held up well, and I'm currently
> >>>>>>> working on hand-crafted attacks. Ted has commented privately (to others,
> >>>>>>> not to me personally) that he will fix bugs for such attacks, though I
> >>>>>>> haven't seen any public comments to that effect.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> _Static_ attacks, or change-image-under-mounted-fs attacks?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Right now only static attacks, change-image-under-mounted-fs attacks
> >>>>> will be next.
> >>>>
> >>>> Do we *really* need to enable unprivileged mounting of kernel filesystems?
> >>>> What about just enabling fuse and implement ext4 and friends as fuse
> >>>> filesystems?
> >>>> Using the approaching Linux Kernel Libary[1] this is easy.
> >>>
> >>> I haven't looked at this project, but I'm guessing that programs must be
> >>> written specifically to make use of it? I.e. you can't just use the
> >>> mount syscall, and thus all existing software still doesn't work?
> >>>
> >>
> >> The projects includes a lklfuse program that uses fuse to mount a
> >> fileystem image.
> >
> > Cool. I gave it a try.
> > It seems to work fine, but only if I run it in foreground (using -d)
> > otherwise fuse blocks every filesystem request.
> >
>
> Now it should work in the background as well, thanks for reporting the issue.
I'm playing with lklfuse now, it's surprisingly easy to get up and
running. I did have a few problems though that I thought you'd like to
know about.
Unfortunately I still can't run it in background mode, I get a segfault.
It's working fine on light workloads, but I'm having issues when I start
trying to stress it. In a couple runs of the stress-ng filesystem
stressors I saw both stress-ng and lklfuse get stuck in uninterruptible
sleep during the first run, and during the second I got some OOM errors
in lklfuse followed by I/O errors and eventually a journal error that
cause the filesystem to go read-only.
The command I used for the first run was:
stress-ng --class filesystem --all 0
And for the second:
stress-ng --class filesystem --seq 0 -v -t 60
There really wasn't anything interesting in the lklfuse output for the
first run, but for the second run I pasted the output here:
http://paste.ubuntu.com/13346993/
I still need to compare this to other fuse filesystems since I haven't
tried this kind of stress test on any others.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-19 15:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-17 16:39 [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] mtd: Check permissions towards mtd " Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 0:00 ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 0:02 ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 0:03 ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 18:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-11-18 0:12 ` James Morris
2015-11-18 0:50 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 17:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates Al Viro
2015-11-17 17:25 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 17:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-17 17:55 ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 18:34 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 19:12 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-17 19:21 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 19:25 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-17 20:12 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-17 22:00 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-19 15:23 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-11-19 16:19 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-19 16:31 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-20 17:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-17 19:26 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-18 19:10 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-11-18 19:28 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 19:32 ` Serge Hallyn
2015-11-17 19:02 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 19:16 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 20:54 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 21:32 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 12:23 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 14:22 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 14:58 ` Al Viro
2015-11-18 15:05 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 15:13 ` Al Viro
2015-11-18 15:19 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 7:47 ` James Morris
2015-11-19 7:53 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 14:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-19 15:04 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 14:37 ` Colin Walters
2015-11-19 14:49 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 15:17 ` Richard W.M. Jones
2015-11-19 14:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-18 15:34 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 15:36 ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-11-17 19:30 ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 20:39 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 21:05 ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 22:01 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 12:46 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 14:30 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 15:38 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
[not found] ` <564C9B92.5080107-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-11-18 18:33 ` Daniel J Walsh
2015-11-18 18:44 ` J. Bruce Fields
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