linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may_access
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 20:06:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161018180624.GA27792@dhcp22.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8737jt903u.fsf@xmission.com>

On Tue 18-10-16 09:56:53, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> writes:
> 
> > On Mon 17-10-16 11:39:49, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> 
> >> During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
> >> not readable by the user executing the file.  A bug in
> >> ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
> >> enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
> >> unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).
> >> 
> >> This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
> >> a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec,
> >> so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present
> >> in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.
> >> 
> >> The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
> >> has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
> >> This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
> >> user namespace it does not become ptraceable.
> >
> > I haven't studied your patch too deeply but one thing that immediately 
> > raised a red flag was that mm might be shared between processes (aka
> > thread groups). What prevents those two to sit in different user
> > namespaces?
> >
> > I am primarily asking because this generated a lot of headache for the
> > memcg handling as those processes might sit in different cgroups while
> > there is only one correct memcg for them which can disagree with the
> > cgroup associated with one of the processes.
> 
> That is a legitimate concern, but I do not see any of those kinds of
> issues here.
> 
> Part of the memcg pain comes from the fact that control groups are
> process centric, and part of the pain comes from the fact that it is
> possible to change control groups.  What I am doing is making the mm
> owned by a user namespace (at creation time), and I am not allowing
> changes to that ownership. The credentials of the tasks that use that mm
> may be in the same user namespace or descendent user namespaces.

OK, then my worries about this weird "threading" model is void.

Thanks for the clarification.
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

      parent reply	other threads:[~2016-10-18 18:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-17 16:39 [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may_access Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-17 17:25 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-17 17:33   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 13:50 ` Michal Hocko
2016-10-18 13:57   ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 14:56   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 15:05     ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 15:35       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 19:12         ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 21:07           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 21:15             ` [REVIEW][PATCH] exec: Don't exec files the userns root can not read Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19  6:13               ` Amir Goldstein
2016-10-19 13:33                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:04                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 15:30               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 16:52                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:29                   ` Jann Horn
2016-10-19 17:32                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 17:55                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 18:38                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 21:26                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 23:17                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 17:02                               ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/3] Fixing ptrace vs exec vs userns interactions Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:05                                 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/3] ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:14                                   ` Kees Cook
2016-11-18 18:56                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:27                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:44                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:08                                 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] exec: Don't allow ptracing an exec of an unreadable file Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 20:47                                   ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 21:07                                     ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 21:32                                       ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 21:51                                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 22:50                                           ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:17                                             ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 23:28                                       ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] exec: Don't allow ptracing an exec of an unreadable file Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:29                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:55                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-18  0:10                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-18  0:35                                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:10                                 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/3] exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19  7:17                                 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/3] Fixing ptrace vs exec vs userns interactions Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19  9:28                                   ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19  9:33                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 18:44                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:35                                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:37                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 18:36                   ` [REVIEW][PATCH] exec: Don't exec files the userns root can not read Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-18 18:06     ` Michal Hocko [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20161018180624.GA27792@dhcp22.suse.cz \
    --to=mhocko@kernel.org \
    --cc=containers@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).