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From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] vfs: reject inodes with negative size to prevent kernel hang
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2016 16:32:22 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161207003222.GI16807@birch.djwong.org> (raw)

Due to insufficient input validation, various filesystem drivers can
load an inode with a negative size from a maliciously crafted fs image.
If this happens, a subsequent write-append operation can cause integer
overflows in the writeback code, causing the kernel to lock up.

Therefore, if we catch anyone trying to link a dentry to a garbage
inode, reject the whole attempt.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
---
The regression tests for this bug are {ext4,xfs}/40[01] in the patch
"xfs/ext4: check negative inode size" that I just sent to fstests@vger.

I realize it's /very/ late in the 4.9 cycle, but this seemed like the
most general way to fix this problem.

Perhaps a better fix is to strengthen the _iget verification in every
filesystem, which I'm working on for 4.10.  But we should at the very
least bonk suspicious looking activity. :)
---
 fs/dcache.c |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
index 5c7cc95..6a253a4 100644
--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -2524,6 +2524,17 @@ static inline void __d_add(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		n = start_dir_add(dir);
 		__d_lookup_done(dentry);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Someone fed us an inode with negative size?!  This can cause
+	 * integer overflows in other parts of the VFS, so reject this.
+	 */
+	if (inode && i_size_read(inode) < 0) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		iput(inode);
+		inode = NULL;
+	}
+
 	if (inode) {
 		unsigned add_flags = d_flags_for_inode(inode);
 		hlist_add_head(&dentry->d_u.d_alias, &inode->i_dentry);
@@ -2946,6 +2957,16 @@ struct dentry *d_splice_alias(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
 	if (!inode)
 		goto out;
 
+	/*
+	 * Someone fed us an inode with negative size?!  This can cause
+	 * integer overflows in other parts of the VFS, so reject this.
+	 */
+	if (i_size_read(inode) < 0) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		iput(inode);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN);
+	}
+
 	security_d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
 	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {

             reply	other threads:[~2016-12-07  0:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-12-07  0:32 Darrick J. Wong [this message]
2016-12-07  3:54 ` [PATCH] vfs: reject inodes with negative size to prevent kernel hang kbuild test robot
2016-12-08  6:10   ` Darrick J. Wong
2016-12-10  1:59 ` Al Viro

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