From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] fscrypt: fix loophole in one-encryption-policy-per-tree enforcement
Date: Tue, 27 Dec 2016 22:48:12 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161228034812.ikoat5x3e7ucnac7@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1482186016-107643-1-git-send-email-ebiggers3@gmail.com>
On Mon, Dec 19, 2016 at 02:20:12PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
>
> Filesystem encryption is designed to enforce that all files in an
> encrypted directory tree use the same encryption policy. Operations
> that violate this constraint are supposed to fail with EPERM. There was
> one case that was missed, however: the cross-rename operation (i.e.
> renameat2 with RENAME_EXCHANGE) allowed two files with different
> encryption policies to be exchanged, provided that neither encryption
> key was available.
I'm actually not sure this is the best way to address this issue.
What I think is better would be to forbid any renames if we are
missing the encryption key for the directory. I had actually noticed
a problem here early when this worked:
root@kvm-xfstests:/# mount -o test_dummy_encryption /dev/vdc /vdc
root@kvm-xfstests:/# mkdir /vdc/test
root@kvm-xfstests:/# cp /etc/motd /vdc/test
root@kvm-xfstests:/# touch /vdc/test/empty
root@kvm-xfstests:/# umount /vdc
root@kvm-xfstests:/# mount /dev/vdc /vdc
root@kvm-xfstests:/# cd /vdc/test
root@kvm-xfstests:/vdc/test# ls -l
total 4
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Dec 27 22:35 6,LKNRJsp209FbXoSvJWzB
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 286 Dec 27 22:35 uRJ5vJh9gE7vcomYMqTAyD
root@kvm-xfstests:/vdc/test# mv uRJ5vJh9gE7vcomYMqTAyD 6,LKNRJsp209FbXoSvJWzB
root@kvm-xfstests:/vdc/test# ls -l
total 4
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 286 Dec 27 22:35 6,LKNRJsp209FbXoSvJWzB
root@kvm-xfstests:/vdc/test#
While there's no cryptographic reason why this can't be done
(obviously), and while a bad guy can always do something like this via
debugfs, I can't see any legitimate reason why we should allow this to
work.
It's one thing to allow a process without the encryption key
(generally with root privileges) to delete a file, but to rename two
files in an encrypted directory? Or as you pointed out, allowing an
exchange of two files via RENAME_EXCHANGE? Even if encryption
policies match, I don't think we should be allowing this at all.
- Ted
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-12-28 3:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-19 22:20 [PATCH v2 1/5] fscrypt: fix loophole in one-encryption-policy-per-tree enforcement Eric Biggers
2016-12-19 22:20 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] fscrypt: fix renaming and linking special files Eric Biggers
2016-12-31 5:49 ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-12-19 22:20 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] ext4: consolidate fscrypt_has_permitted_context() checks Eric Biggers
2016-12-28 5:41 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-01-05 19:03 ` Eric Biggers
2016-12-19 22:20 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] f2fs: " Eric Biggers
2016-12-19 22:20 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] ubifs: " Eric Biggers
2016-12-28 3:48 ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2016-12-28 5:22 ` [PATCH] ext4: don't allow encrypted operations without keys Theodore Ts'o
2017-01-05 19:26 ` Eric Biggers
2017-01-05 20:15 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-02-04 21:44 ` Eric Biggers
2017-02-06 1:13 ` Theodore Ts'o
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