From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Cc: "Theodore Y . Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fscrypt: add a documentation file for filesystem-level encryption
Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 10:36:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170822173600.GB9587@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a84707f9-b9b9-fe7e-b2f5-d5edfcb9c91a@oracle.com>
On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 11:35:20PM +0800, Anand Jain wrote:
> >>
> >> I think AE is the only good solution for this, File-name encryption at
> >>this stage won't solve any kind of Evil Maid attack, (as it was quoted
> >>somewhere else in ML).
> >>
> >>
> >> Further, below, is define but not used.
> >>-----
> >> #define FS_AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE 32
> >>-----
> >>
> >
> >Yes, authenticated encryption with AES-256-GCM was in an older version of the
> >ext4 encryption design document. But unfortunately it was never really thought
> >through. The primary problem, even ignoring rollback protection, is that there
> >is nowhere to store the per-block metadata (GCM authentication tag and IV) *and*
> >have it updated atomicly with the block contents. Recently, dm-integrity solves
> >this at the block device layer, but it uses data journaling which is very
> >inefficient. This maybe could be implemented more efficiently on a COW
> >filesystem like BTRFS. But even after that, another problem is that
> >authenticated encryption of file contents only would not stop an attacker from
> >swapping around blocks, files, directories, or creating links, etc.
>
>
> Some of the problems to be solved in this area are quite
> interesting and challenging and IMO BTRFS fits nicely. Per extent AE
> for BTRFS is drafted, it needs scrutiny and constructive feedback.
>
> Thanks, Anand
>
>
> >Eric
> >
Where is the code? Is there a design document, and it is it readable by people
not as familiar with btrfs? Is the API compatible with ext4, f2fs, and ubifs?
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-22 17:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-08-18 19:47 [PATCH] fscrypt: add a documentation file for filesystem-level encryption Eric Biggers
2017-08-18 21:06 ` Andreas Dilger
2017-08-20 2:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-08-21 22:33 ` Eric Biggers
2017-08-21 13:44 ` Anand Jain
2017-08-21 21:02 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-08-21 23:08 ` Eric Biggers
2017-08-22 2:22 ` Anand Jain
2017-08-22 3:07 ` Eric Biggers
2017-08-22 15:35 ` Anand Jain
2017-08-22 17:36 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2017-08-28 12:18 ` Anand Jain
2017-08-31 18:14 ` Eric Biggers
2017-08-22 3:07 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-08-22 2:22 ` Anand Jain
2017-08-22 2:55 ` Eric Biggers
2017-08-22 15:33 ` Anand Jain
2017-08-22 17:07 ` Eric Biggers
2017-08-28 12:18 ` Anand Jain
2017-08-28 14:22 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-08-29 3:54 ` Anand Jain
2017-08-31 18:10 ` Eric Biggers
2017-08-31 17:50 ` Eric Biggers
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