From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mga02.intel.com ([134.134.136.20]:20251 "EHLO mga02.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755358AbdLTNS1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Dec 2017 08:18:27 -0500 Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 15:18:13 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Pavel Machek Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov , "David S. Miller" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Grzegorz Andrejczuk , Haim Cohen , Ingo Molnar , Janakarajan Natarajan , Jim Mattson , Kan Liang , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Kyle Huey , Len Brown , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , "open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)" , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Paolo Bonzini , Piotr Luc , Radim Kr??m???? , Randy Dunlap , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Tom Lendacky , Vikas Shivappa Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver Message-ID: <20171220131813.esk3ucfcvx42gmva@linux.intel.com> References: <20171125193132.24321-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20171212140750.GA19663@localhost> <1513726426.2206.18.camel@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1513726426.2206.18.camel@linux.intel.com> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 01:33:46AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Tue, 2017-12-12 at 15:07 +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > > On Sat 2017-11-25 21:29:17, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to > > > set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is > > > disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access control. > > > In a way you can think that SGX provides inverted sandbox. It protects the > > > application from a malicious host. > > > > Would you list guarantees provided by SGX? > > > > For example, host can still observe timing of cachelines being > > accessed by "protected" app, right? Can it also introduce bit flips? > > > > Pavel > > I'll give a more proper response to this now that all the reported major > issues in the code have been fixed in v9. > > Yes, SGX is vulnerable to the L1 cacheline timing attacks. Jethro > Beekman wrote a great summary about this on early March: > > https://jbeekman.nl/blog/2017/03/sgx-side-channel-attacks/ > > The counter measures are the same as without SGX. It really does not > add or degrade security in this area. This came up even in my patch set :-) I.e. I switched to kernel AES-NI from TinyCrypt's AES because the latter is not timing resistant. /Jarkko