From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:39183 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753752AbeAQTbz (ORCPT ); Wed, 17 Jan 2018 14:31:55 -0500 Received: from mail-io0-f200.google.com ([209.85.223.200]) by youngberry.canonical.com with esmtps (TLS1.0:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1ebtRB-0005s9-Im for linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org; Wed, 17 Jan 2018 19:31:53 +0000 Received: by mail-io0-f200.google.com with SMTP id x71so19163996iod.3 for ; Wed, 17 Jan 2018 11:31:53 -0800 (PST) Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 13:31:24 -0600 From: Seth Forshee To: Alban Crequy Cc: Dongsu Park , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, "Eric W . Biederman" , Miklos Szeredi , Sargun Dhillon , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo , David Herrmann , Tom Gundersen Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/11] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Message-ID: <20180117193124.GC3723@ubuntu-xps13> References: <20180117142935.GA3723@ubuntu-xps13> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 07:56:59PM +0100, Alban Crequy wrote: > On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 3:29 PM, Seth Forshee > wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 11:59:06AM +0100, Alban Crequy wrote: > >> [Adding Tejun, David, Tom for question about cuse] > >> > >> On Fri, Dec 22, 2017 at 3:32 PM, Dongsu Park wrote: > >> > From: Seth Forshee > >> > > >> > In order to support mounts from namespaces other than > >> > init_user_ns, fuse must translate uids and gids to/from the > >> > userns of the process servicing requests on /dev/fuse. This > >> > patch does that, with a couple of restrictions on the namespace: > >> > > >> > - The userns for the fuse connection is fixed to the namespace > >> > from which /dev/fuse is opened. > >> > > >> > - The namespace must be the same as s_user_ns. > >> > > >> > These restrictions simplify the implementation by avoiding the > >> > need to pass around userns references and by allowing fuse to > >> > rely on the checks in inode_change_ok for ownership changes. > >> > Either restriction could be relaxed in the future if needed. > >> > > >> > For cuse the namespace used for the connection is also simply > >> > current_user_ns() at the time /dev/cuse is opened. > >> > >> Was a use case discussed for using cuse in a new unprivileged userns? > >> > >> I ran some tests yesterday with cusexmp [1] and I could add a new char > >> device as an unprivileged user with: > >> > >> $ unshare -U -r -m sh -c 'mount --bind /mnt/cuse /dev/cuse ; cusexmp > >> --maj=99 --min=30 --name=foo > >> > >> where /mnt/cuse is previously mknod'ed correctly and chmod'ed 777. > >> Then, I could see the new device: > >> > >> $ cat /proc/devices | grep foo > >> 99 foo > >> > >> On normal distros, we don't have a /mnt/cuse chmod'ed 777 but still it > >> seems dangerous if the dev node can be provided otherwise and if we > >> don't have a use case for it. > >> > >> Thoughts? > > > > I can't remember the specific reasons, but I had concluded that letting > > unprivileged users use cuse within a user namespace isn't safe. But > > having a cuse device node usable by regular users at all is equally > > unsafe I suspect, > > This makes sense. > > > so I don't think your example demonstrates any problem > > specific to user namespaces. There shouldn't be any way to use a user > > namespace to gain access permissions towards /dev/cuse, otherwise we > > have bigger problems than cuse to worry about. > > From my tests, the patch seem safe but I don't fully understand why that is. > > I am not trying to gain more permissions towards /dev/cuse but to > create another cuse char file from within the unprivileged userns. I > tested the scenario by patching the memfs userspace FUSE driver to > generate the char device whenever the file is named "cuse" (turning > the regular file into a char device with the cuse major/minor behind > the scene): > > $ unshare -U -r -m > # memfs /mnt/memfs & > # ls -l /mnt/memfs > # echo -n > /mnt/memfs/cuse > -bash: /mnt/memfs/cuse: Input/output error > # ls -l /mnt/memfs/cuse > crwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 10, 203 Jan 17 18:24 /mnt/memfs/cuse > # cat /mnt/memfs/cuse > cat: /mnt/memfs/cuse: Permission denied > > But then, I could not use that char device, even though it seems to > have the correct major/minor and permissions. The kernel FUSE code > seems to call init_special_inode() to handle character devices. I > don't understand why it seems to be safe. Because for new mounts in non-init user namespaces alloc_super() sets SB_I_NODEV flag in s_iflags, which disallows opening device nodes in that filesystem. Seth