From: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 13:57:16 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180525035716.GE10363@dastard> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87y3g8y6x9.fsf@xmission.com>
On Thu, May 24, 2018 at 06:23:30PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> writes:
>
> > On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 06:22:56PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >>
> >> Very slowly the work has been progressing to ensure the vfs has the
> >> necessary support for mounting filesystems without privilege.
> >
> > What's the thinking behind how system administrators and/or file
> > systems would configure whether or not a particular file system type
> > will be allowed to be mounted w/o privilege?
>
> The mechanism is .fs_flags in file_system_type. If the FS_USERNS_MOUNT
> flag is set then root in a user namespace (AKA an unprivileged user)
> will be allowed to mount to mount the filesystem.
>
> There are very real concerns about attacking a filesystem with an
> invalid filesystem image, or by a malicious protocol speaker. So I
> don't want to enable anything without the file system maintainers
> consent and without a reasonable expecation that neither a system wide
> denial of service attack nor a privilege escalation attack is possible
> from if the filesystem is enabled.
>
> So at a practical level what we have in the vfs is the non-fuse specific
> bits that enable unprivileged mounts of fuse. Things like handling
> of unmapped uid and gids, how normally trusted xattrs are dealt with,
> etc.
>
> A big practical one for me is that if either the uid or gid is not
> mapped the vfs avoids writing to the inode.
>
> Right now my practical goal is to be able to say: "Go run your
> filesystem in userspace with fuse if you want stronger security
> guarantees." I think that will be enough to make removable media
> reasonably safe from privilege escalation attacks.
>
> There is enough code in most filesystems that I don't know what our
> chances of locking down very many of them are. But I figure a few more
> of them are possible.
I'm not sure we need to - fusefs-lkl gives users the ability to
mount any of the kernel filesystems via fuse without us needing to
support unprivileged kernel mounts for those filesystems.
Cheers,
Dave.
--
Dave Chinner
david@fromorbit.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-25 3:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-23 23:22 [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/6] vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 12:58 ` Seth Forshee
2018-05-24 22:30 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/6] vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 13:55 ` Seth Forshee
2018-05-24 16:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 17:22 ` Seth Forshee
2018-05-24 19:12 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to replace invalid owners of inodes Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-23 23:41 ` [REVIEW][PATCH v2 " Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 22:30 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 4/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 15:58 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-24 16:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 17:28 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 5/6] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 15:57 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 6/6] fs: Allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in s_user_ns to freeze and thaw filesystems Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 15:59 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-24 21:46 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-24 23:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-25 3:57 ` Dave Chinner [this message]
2018-05-25 4:06 ` Darrick J. Wong
2018-05-29 13:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-29 22:17 ` Dave Chinner
2018-05-30 2:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30 4:34 ` Dave Chinner
2018-05-29 15:40 ` Dongsu Park
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180525035716.GE10363@dastard \
--to=david@fromorbit.com \
--cc=christian@brauner.io \
--cc=containers@lists.linux-foundation.org \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=seth.forshee@canonical.com \
--cc=tytso@mit.edu \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).