From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from www.llwyncelyn.cymru ([82.70.14.225]:60402 "EHLO fuzix.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728200AbeI1OFG (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Sep 2018 10:05:06 -0400 Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 23:39:03 +0100 From: Alan Cox To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" Cc: TongZhang , Cyrill Gorcunov , adobriyan@gmail.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Subject: Re: Leaking path for set_task_comm Message-ID: <20180926233903.38fb598a@alans-desktop> In-Reply-To: <20180926031645.GB3321@thunk.org> References: <20180925183953.GI15710@uranus> <0CD63E6E-7512-4DD6-8858-4408416DC730@vt.edu> <20180926031645.GB3321@thunk.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: > Trying to depend on task name for anything security sensitive is at > _really_ bad idea, so it seems unlikely that a LSM would want to > protect the process name. (And if they did, the first thing I would > ask is "Why? What are you trying to do? Do you realize how many > *other* ways the process name can be spoofed or otherwise controlled > by a potentially malicious user?") Two processes that should not be able to otherwise communicate can keep changing their name to a chunk of data, waiting for an ack flag name change back. Alan