From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, bmktuwien@gmail.com,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 10:10:56 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181212151056.2938-2-sds@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181212151056.2938-1-sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
commit bda0be7ad9948 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
switched selinux_inode_follow_link() to use avc_has_perm_flags() and
pass down the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag if called during RCU walk. However,
the only test of MAY_NOT_BLOCK occurs during slow_avc_audit()
and only if passing an inode as audit data (LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE). Since
selinux_inode_follow_link() passes a dentry directly, passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
here serves no purpose. Switch selinux_inode_follow_link() to use
avc_has_perm() and drop avc_has_perm_flags() since there are no other
users.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
security/selinux/avc.c | 24 ++----------------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++---
security/selinux/include/avc.h | 5 -----
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 5de18a6d5c3f..9b63d8ee1687 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -867,9 +867,8 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
* permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode.
*
* See the corresponding handling in slow_avc_audit(), and the
- * logic in selinux_inode_follow_link and selinux_inode_permission
- * for the VFS MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag, which is transliterated into
- * AVC_NONBLOCKING for avc_has_perm_noaudit().
+ * logic in selinux_inode_permission for the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag,
+ * which is transliterated into AVC_NONBLOCKING.
*/
if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING)
return 0;
@@ -1209,25 +1208,6 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
return rc;
}
-int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
- u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
- int flags)
-{
- struct av_decision avd;
- int rc, rc2;
-
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
- (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
- &avd);
-
- rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
- auditdata, flags);
- if (rc2)
- return rc2;
- return rc;
-}
-
u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state)
{
return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9b05f84808d9..f012d2eb159e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3139,9 +3139,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
if (IS_ERR(isec))
return PTR_ERR(isec);
- return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
- sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
- rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
}
static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 74ea50977c20..7be0e1e90e8b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -153,11 +153,6 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
-int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
- u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
- int flags);
int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
--
2.19.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-12 15:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-12-12 15:10 [PATCH 1/2] selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk Stephen Smalley
2018-12-12 15:10 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-01-11 1:37 ` [PATCH 2/2] selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link Paul Moore
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