From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
To: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Fw: WARNING: bad usercopy in fanotify_read
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:45:28 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190312114528.GA32521@quack2.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190311163004.68f936ab4119a7e8dd272f59@linux-foundation.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5310 bytes --]
Thanks for forwarding Andrew!
On Mon 11-03-19 16:30:04, Andrew Morton wrote:
> fyi
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 13:42:06 -0700
> From: syzbot <syzbot+2c49971e251e36216d1f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
> To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, cai@lca.pw, crecklin@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
> Subject: WARNING: bad usercopy in fanotify_read
>
>
> Hello,
>
> syzbot found the following crash on:
>
> HEAD commit: 12ad143e Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git..
> git tree: upstream
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12776f57200000
> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e9d91b7192a5e96e
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2c49971e251e36216d1f
> compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
> userspace arch: amd64
> syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1287516f200000
> C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17ee410b200000
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+2c49971e251e36216d1f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected
> from SLAB object 'fanotify_event' (offset 40, size 8)!
> WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7649 at mm/usercopy.c:78 usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110
> mm/usercopy.c:78
Yeah, right. We need to create fanotify_event cache so that copying of
fanotify_event.fid.fh to userspace is allowed. Sadly the area is unioned
with a possible slab pointer so that won't be protected from leaking but
life is not perfect. Amir, something like attached patch?
Honza
> Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
> CPU: 1 PID: 7649 Comm: syz-executor381 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #17
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
> Google 01/01/2011
> Call Trace:
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
> panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214
> __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:571
> report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186
> fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline]
> fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline]
> do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272
> do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291
> invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973
> RIP: 0010:usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110 mm/usercopy.c:78
> Code: c8 e8 d9 88 c0 ff 4c 8b 45 c0 4d 89 e9 4c 89 e1 48 8b 55 c8 41 57 48
> 89 de 48 c7 c7 e0 dc 74 87 ff 75 d0 41 56 e8 03 4b 93 ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c4
> 18 e9 46 ff ff ff 49 c7 c5 e0 da 74 87 4d 89 ee 4d
> RSP: 0018:ffff8880a417fb18 EFLAGS: 00010282
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8774dca0 RCX: 0000000000000000
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff815ad7b6 RDI: ffffed101482ff55
> RBP: ffff8880a417fb70 R08: ffff888088d78580 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8859408d
> R13: ffffffff8775d500 R14: ffffffff8774db20 R15: 0000000000000008
> __check_heap_object+0x88/0xb3 mm/slab.c:4453
> check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:238 [inline]
> __check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:284 [inline]
> __check_object_size+0x342/0x42f mm/usercopy.c:254
> check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:119 [inline]
> check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:150 [inline]
> copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:151 [inline]
> copy_fid_to_user fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:236 [inline]
> copy_event_to_user fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:294 [inline]
> fanotify_read+0xde0/0x1430 fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:362
> __vfs_read+0x8d/0x110 fs/read_write.c:416
> vfs_read+0x194/0x3e0 fs/read_write.c:452
> ksys_read+0xea/0x1f0 fs/read_write.c:578
> __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:588 [inline]
> __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:586 [inline]
> __x64_sys_read+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:586
> do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> RIP: 0033:0x4456b9
> Code: e8 6c b6 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7
> 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
> ff 0f 83 2b 12 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
> RSP: 002b:00007fb296f31db8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dac28 RCX: 00000000004456b9
> RDX: 000000000000006b RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
> RBP: 00000000006dac20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dac2c
> R13: 00007ffd8eb3d16f R14: 00007fb296f329c0 R15: 20c49ba5e353f7cf
> Kernel Offset: disabled
> Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
>
>
> ---
> This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>
> syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bug-status-tracking for how to communicate with
> syzbot.
> syzbot can test patches for this bug, for details see:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
--
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
[-- Attachment #2: 0001-fanotify-Allow-copying-of-file-handle-to-userspace.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 1419 bytes --]
From beb8c3a76f2740757fb1765f793bb394ad71c183 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:42:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fanotify: Allow copying of file handle to userspace
When file handle is embedded inside fanotify_event and usercopy checks
are enabled, we get a warning like:
Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected
from SLAB object 'fanotify_event' (offset 40, size 8)!
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7649 at mm/usercopy.c:78 usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110
mm/usercopy.c:78
Annotate handling in fanotify_event properly to mark copying it to
userspace is fine.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
---
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index 56992b32c6bb..84dbe1f1832c 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -1092,7 +1092,8 @@ static int __init fanotify_user_setup(void)
fanotify_mark_cache = KMEM_CACHE(fsnotify_mark,
SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT);
- fanotify_event_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fanotify_event, SLAB_PANIC);
+ fanotify_event_cachep = KMEM_CACHE_USERCOPY(fanotify_event, SLAB_PANIC,
+ fid.fh);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS)) {
fanotify_perm_event_cachep =
KMEM_CACHE(fanotify_perm_event, SLAB_PANIC);
--
2.16.4
next parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-12 11:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190311163004.68f936ab4119a7e8dd272f59@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-12 11:45 ` Jan Kara [this message]
2019-03-12 12:59 ` Fw: WARNING: bad usercopy in fanotify_read Amir Goldstein
2019-03-12 16:35 ` Jan Kara
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