From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C099DC19759 for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 16:09:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1F62206B8 for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 16:09:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731876AbfHAQJO (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Aug 2019 12:09:14 -0400 Received: from zeniv.linux.org.uk ([195.92.253.2]:55530 "EHLO ZenIV.linux.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727403AbfHAQJN (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Aug 2019 12:09:13 -0400 Received: from viro by ZenIV.linux.org.uk with local (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1htDde-0003to-U2; Thu, 01 Aug 2019 16:09:11 +0000 Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 17:09:10 +0100 From: Al Viro To: Ondrej Mosnacek Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] selinux: fix race when removing selinuxfs entries Message-ID: <20190801160910.GW1131@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> References: <20190801140243.24080-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190801140243.24080-1-omosnace@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.12.0 (2019-05-25) Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Aug 01, 2019 at 04:02:39PM +0200, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > After hours and hours of getting familiar with dcache and debugging, > I think I finally found a solution that works and hopefully stands a > chance of being committed. > > The series still doesn't address the lack of atomicity of the policy > reload transition, but this is part of a wider problem and can be > resolved later. Let's fix at least the userspace-triggered lockup > first. I don't think this is the right approach. Consider the related problem: what happens if somebody has mounted something upon a selinuxfs file? That is the hard part here, and AFAICS your variant doesn't help it at all...