From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.9 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B3FE2C17441 for ; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 23:15:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8D79F21925 for ; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 23:15:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="gMuZpNu2" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727237AbfKLXPS (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Nov 2019 18:15:18 -0500 Received: from mail-pf1-f193.google.com ([209.85.210.193]:40744 "EHLO mail-pf1-f193.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726994AbfKLXPS (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Nov 2019 18:15:18 -0500 Received: by mail-pf1-f193.google.com with SMTP id r4so181628pfl.7 for ; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 15:15:17 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=q/7zKomDvwvoQVmplaYbzXQkEiXPJRscqerdxI0XpvE=; b=gMuZpNu2ZWWW1U1Djp24A57ML3WMX9pxLpjzy9vcatjVYek6YJx07FQmY8w0YIjtWk npdddXUg54q759/2mZ1xUDLqAY/tN+mCvK2bLXfWZscdZbUFsmPrJ8mGS42dXbUexSqn FLkNDOuNubyqmyvpl7RPVvVrXPThIpjdJPxl8= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=q/7zKomDvwvoQVmplaYbzXQkEiXPJRscqerdxI0XpvE=; b=Tydsex7Y+iM4S822ZTPmIqigB1M9RPmbsQgz8Hzcj/tok4C5rkMMltRJRwro3McQze hgO22y2dTaKHh0CPRtkE/9O2bid3I9sgv5DJRp5z127ywmismq0tHLnPNrNz6D6qhWRB eMEDUygcsNv6JGrEhBYalb/BqmNgYKplR2NpGvAMDLsiD95PfqaJWfNEUGfZntC7Y1Ld DG3II4rUdABydY9pUop8bw9vcu6i7jRF1qO1zde8Cswa7AfeT1z5YQxmD8e4ZqXfjtYB MZdmJVaRuY5l5dj0dIR8n1Vnw4GQbZTaLMEQPPDL/i4q04mCjVRQOnTnbXPqtIHQz36j FeAQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAV0jVvOzrgMjjUprD8RsEO2AVCWs4pS1ZpMYa3TbnAbnScCinMk xGWFnNovLbnFmt4eVySCJGWgVxSAmfM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqy+Au3kYLmA11xfFKoZBV6/GOO9I8Z5Zy4Zp4gEbzdOoKsHxdFIrmkacipgx8+7hy/Mu8ANxw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90a:3b0d:: with SMTP id d13mr473073pjc.86.1573600517339; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 15:15:17 -0800 (PST) Received: from www.outflux.net (smtp.outflux.net. [198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l74sm172205pje.29.2019.11.12.15.15.16 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 12 Nov 2019 15:15:16 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 15:15:15 -0800 From: Kees Cook To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" Cc: Topi Miettinen , Luis Chamberlain , Alexey Dobriyan , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)" Subject: Re: [PATCH] Allow restricting permissions in /proc/sys Message-ID: <201911121514.DA3BEED0@keescook> References: <74a91362-247c-c749-5200-7bdce704ed9e@gmail.com> <20191103175648.GA4603@mit.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20191103175648.GA4603@mit.edu> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org On Sun, Nov 03, 2019 at 12:56:48PM -0500, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > On Sun, Nov 03, 2019 at 04:55:48PM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote: > > Several items in /proc/sys need not be accessible to unprivileged > > tasks. Let the system administrator change the permissions, but only > > to more restrictive modes than what the sysctl tables allow. > > > > Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen > > Why should restruct the system administrator from changing the > permissions to one which is more lax than what the sysctl tables? > > The system administrator is already very much trusted. Why should we > take that discretion away from the system administrator? Generally speaking, they're there to provide some sense of boundary between uid 0 and the kernel proper. I think it's correct to not allow weakening of these permissions (which is the current state: no change at all). -- Kees Cook