From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"virtio-fs@redhat.com" <virtio-fs@redhat.com>,
"berrange@redhat.com" <berrange@redhat.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 08:21:36 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210701122136.GA159380@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YN2BYXv79PswrN2E@work-vm>
On Thu, Jul 01, 2021 at 09:48:33AM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Theodore Ts'o (tytso@mit.edu) wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 04:01:42PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > >
> > > Even if you fix symlinks, I don't think it fixes device nodes or
> > > anything else where the permissions bitmap isn't purely used as the
> > > permissions on the inode.
> >
> > I think we're making a mountain out of a molehill. Again, very few
> > people are using quota these days. And if you give someone write
> > access to a 8TB disk, do you really care if they can "steal" 32k worth
> > of space (which is the maximum size of an xattr, enforced by the VFS).
> >
> > OK, but what about character mode devices? First of all, most users
> > don't have access to huge number of devices, but let's assume
> > something absurd. Let's say that a user has write access to *1024*
> > devices. (My /dev has 233 character mode devices, and I have write
> > access to well under a dozen.)
> >
> > An 8TB disk costs about $200. So how much of the "stolen" quota space
> > are we talking about, assuming the user has access to 1024 devices,
> > and the file system actually supports a 32k xattr.
> >
> > 32k * 1024 * $200 / 8TB / (1024*1024*1024) = $0.000763 = 0.0763 cents
> >
> > A 2TB SSD is less around $180, so even if we calculate the prices
> > based on SSD space, we're still talking about a quarter of a penny.
> >
> > Why are we worrying about this?
>
> I'm not worrying about storage cost, but we would need to define what
> the rules are on who can write and change a user.* xattr on a device
> node. It doesn't feel sane to make it anyone who can write to the
> device; then everyone can start leaving droppings on /dev/null.
Looks like tmpfs/devtmpfs might not support setting user.* xattrs. So
devices nodes there should not be a problem.
# touch /dev/foo.txt
# setfattr -n "user.foo" -v "bar" /dev/foo.txt
setfattr: /dev/foo.txt: Operation not supported
Vivek
>
> The other evilness I can imagine, is if there's a 32k limit on xattrs on
> a node, an evil user could write almost 32k of junk to the node
> and then break the next login that tries to add an acl or breaks the
> next relabel.
>
> Dave
>
> > - Ted
> >
> --
> Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-07-01 12:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-25 19:12 [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Vivek Goyal
2021-06-25 19:12 ` [PATCH 1/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 12:33 ` Christian Brauner
2021-06-28 15:00 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 3:13 ` [xattr] 8d8cd767b6: ltp.setxattr02.fail kernel test robot
2021-06-29 12:59 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-25 21:49 ` [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Schaufler, Casey
2021-06-28 11:58 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-28 13:17 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 13:36 ` Daniel Walsh
2021-06-28 16:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-28 16:28 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-28 17:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 9:00 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-29 14:38 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 15:20 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 16:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 16:35 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-29 16:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 17:35 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 20:28 ` Daniel Walsh
2021-06-30 4:12 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 8:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-30 14:47 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 15:01 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-30 19:59 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 20:32 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-07-01 8:48 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-01 12:21 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2021-07-01 13:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-07-01 16:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-30 16:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-30 14:27 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 16:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-28 17:22 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 18:55 ` Daniel Walsh
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