From: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
To: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>, <kernel-team@fb.com>
Subject: [PATCH] fuse: allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in root userns to access allow_other mount
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 14:11:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211111221142.4096653-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com> (raw)
Since commit 73f03c2b4b52 ("fuse: Restrict allow_other to the
superblock's namespace or a descendant"), access to allow_other FUSE
filesystems has been limited to users in the mounting user namespace or
descendants. This prevents a process that is privileged in its userns -
but not its parent namespaces - from mounting a FUSE fs w/ allow_other
that is accessible to processes in parent namespaces.
While this restriction makes sense overall it breaks a legitimate
usecase for me. I have a tracing daemon which needs to peek into
process' open files in order to symbolicate - similar to 'perf'. The
daemon is a privileged process in the root userns, but is unable to peek
into FUSE filesystems mounted with allow_other by processes in child
namespaces.
This patch adds an escape hatch to the descendant userns logic
specifically for processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the root userns. Such
processes can already do many dangerous things regardless of namespace,
and moreover could fork and setns into any child userns with a FUSE
mount, so it's reasonable to allow them to interact with all allow_other
FUSE filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
---
Note: I was unsure whether CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_PTRACE was the best
choice of capability here. Went with the former as it's checked
elsewhere in fs/fuse while CAP_SYS_PTRACE isn't.
fs/fuse/dir.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
index 0654bfedcbb0..2524eeb0f35d 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
const struct cred *cred;
if (fc->allow_other)
- return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns);
+ return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
cred = current_cred();
if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) &&
--
2.30.2
next reply other threads:[~2021-11-11 22:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-11 22:11 Dave Marchevsky [this message]
2021-11-12 2:10 ` [PATCH] fuse: allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in root userns to access allow_other mount Rik van Riel
2021-11-12 10:13 ` Christian Brauner
2021-11-12 23:29 ` Dave Marchevsky
2021-11-15 15:28 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-05-17 16:50 ` Dave Marchevsky
2022-05-18 11:22 ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-18 11:26 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-05-19 4:56 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2022-05-19 8:59 ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-24 4:35 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2022-05-24 7:07 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-05-24 14:59 ` Rik van Riel
2022-05-24 15:44 ` Christian Brauner
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