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From: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>
To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input)
Cc: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>,
	John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
	Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, paulmoore@microsoft.com,
	Luca.Boccassi@microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH v19 4/4] overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 01:58:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211117015806.2192263-5-dvander@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211117015806.2192263-1-dvander@google.com>

From: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>

Using old_creds as an indication that we are not overriding the
credentials, bypass call to inode_owner_or_capable.  This solves
a problem with all execv calls being blocked when using the caller's
credentials.

Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>
Fixes: 05acefb4872da ("ovl: check permission to open real file")
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: paulmoore@microsoft.com
Cc: Luca.Boccassi@microsoft.com

v19 - rebase

v18 - rebase

v17 - rebase

v16 - introduced fix over rebased series
---
 fs/overlayfs/file.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
index 11d8277c94cd..586de55bba79 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
 	if (err) {
 		realfile = ERR_PTR(err);
 	} else {
-		if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, realinode))
+		if (old_cred && !inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns,
+							realinode))
 			flags &= ~O_NOATIME;
 
 		realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
-- 
2.34.0.rc1.387.gb447b232ab-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-17  1:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-17  1:58 [PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix David Anderson
2021-11-17  1:58 ` [PATCH v19 1/4] Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr David Anderson
2021-11-17 16:13   ` kernel test robot
2022-03-25 11:02   ` Luca Weiss
2022-03-25 14:44     ` Paul Moore
2021-11-17  1:58 ` [PATCH v19 2/4] overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method David Anderson
2021-11-17  1:58 ` [PATCH v19 3/4] overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred David Anderson
2021-11-17  1:58 ` David Anderson [this message]
2021-11-17  2:18 ` [PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix Casey Schaufler
2021-11-18  7:59   ` David Anderson
2021-11-17  7:36 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-11-18  9:53   ` David Anderson
2021-11-18 10:20     ` Amir Goldstein
2021-11-18 20:15       ` David Anderson
2021-11-18 20:32         ` Amir Goldstein
2025-02-25 19:26           ` Paul Lawrence
2025-02-25 22:14             ` Paul Moore
2021-12-03 15:37   ` Vivek Goyal
2021-12-03 16:04     ` Paul Moore
2021-12-03 16:31     ` Amir Goldstein
2021-12-03 18:34       ` Vivek Goyal
2022-03-01  1:09         ` Paul Moore
     [not found]           ` <CA+FmFJA-r+JgMqObNCvE_X+L6jxWtDrczM9Jh0L38Fq-6mnbbA@mail.gmail.com>
2022-03-09 21:13             ` Paul Moore
2022-03-10 22:11               ` Paul Moore
2022-03-11  4:09                 ` Amir Goldstein
2022-03-11 14:01                   ` Vivek Goyal
2022-03-11 20:52                     ` Paul Moore
2023-03-22  7:28                       ` Johannes Segitz
2023-03-22 12:48                         ` Amir Goldstein
2023-03-22 14:07                           ` Paul Moore
2023-03-22 14:05                         ` Paul Moore

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