From: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>
To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input)
Cc: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, paulmoore@microsoft.com,
Luca.Boccassi@microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH v19 4/4] overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 01:58:06 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211117015806.2192263-5-dvander@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211117015806.2192263-1-dvander@google.com>
From: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Using old_creds as an indication that we are not overriding the
credentials, bypass call to inode_owner_or_capable. This solves
a problem with all execv calls being blocked when using the caller's
credentials.
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>
Fixes: 05acefb4872da ("ovl: check permission to open real file")
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: paulmoore@microsoft.com
Cc: Luca.Boccassi@microsoft.com
v19 - rebase
v18 - rebase
v17 - rebase
v16 - introduced fix over rebased series
---
fs/overlayfs/file.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
index 11d8277c94cd..586de55bba79 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
if (err) {
realfile = ERR_PTR(err);
} else {
- if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, realinode))
+ if (old_cred && !inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns,
+ realinode))
flags &= ~O_NOATIME;
realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
--
2.34.0.rc1.387.gb447b232ab-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-17 1:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-17 1:58 [PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix David Anderson
2021-11-17 1:58 ` [PATCH v19 1/4] Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr David Anderson
2021-11-17 16:13 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-25 11:02 ` Luca Weiss
2022-03-25 14:44 ` Paul Moore
2021-11-17 1:58 ` [PATCH v19 2/4] overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method David Anderson
2021-11-17 1:58 ` [PATCH v19 3/4] overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred David Anderson
2021-11-17 1:58 ` David Anderson [this message]
2021-11-17 2:18 ` [PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix Casey Schaufler
2021-11-18 7:59 ` David Anderson
2021-11-17 7:36 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-11-18 9:53 ` David Anderson
2021-11-18 10:20 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-11-18 20:15 ` David Anderson
2021-11-18 20:32 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-02-25 19:26 ` Paul Lawrence
2025-02-25 22:14 ` Paul Moore
2021-12-03 15:37 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-12-03 16:04 ` Paul Moore
2021-12-03 16:31 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-12-03 18:34 ` Vivek Goyal
2022-03-01 1:09 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <CA+FmFJA-r+JgMqObNCvE_X+L6jxWtDrczM9Jh0L38Fq-6mnbbA@mail.gmail.com>
2022-03-09 21:13 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-10 22:11 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-11 4:09 ` Amir Goldstein
2022-03-11 14:01 ` Vivek Goyal
2022-03-11 20:52 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-22 7:28 ` Johannes Segitz
2023-03-22 12:48 ` Amir Goldstein
2023-03-22 14:07 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-22 14:05 ` Paul Moore
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