From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 9/9] landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 17:49:08 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221001154908.49665-10-gnoack3000@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221001154908.49665-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Use the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag in the tutorial.
Adapt the backwards compatibility example and discussion to remove the
truncation flag where needed.
Point out potential surprising behaviour related to truncate.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index b8ea59493964..44d6f598b63d 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
=====================================
:Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: May 2022
+:Date: October 2022
The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
};
Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
@@ -69,16 +70,27 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are
using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or
none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version
of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should
-remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` access right which is only supported
-starting with the second version of the ABI.
+remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE``
+access rights, which are only supported starting with the second and third
+version of the ABI.
.. code-block:: c
int abi;
abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
- if (abi < 2) {
+ if (abi < 0) {
+ perror("The running kernel does not enable to use Landlock");
+ return 0; /* Degrade gracefully if Landlock is not handled. */
+ }
+ switch (abi) {
+ case 1:
+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */
ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
+ __attribute__((fallthrough));
+ case 2:
+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
}
This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -127,8 +139,8 @@ descriptor.
It may also be required to create rules following the same logic as explained
for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock
-ABI version. In this example, this is not required because
-`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` is not allowed by any rule.
+ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested
+``allowed_access`` rights are already available in ABI 1.
We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while
denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to
@@ -251,6 +263,37 @@ To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target
process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules,
which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer.
+Truncating files
+----------------
+
+The operations covered by ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE`` and
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` both change the contents of a file and sometimes
+overlap in non-intuitive ways. It is recommended to always specify both of
+these together.
+
+A particularly surprising example is :manpage:`creat(2)`. The name suggests
+that this system call requires the rights to create and write files. However,
+it also requires the truncate right if an existing file under the same name is
+already present.
+
+It should also be noted that truncating files does not require the
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE`` right. Apart from the :manpage:`truncate(2)`
+system call, this can also be done through :manpage:`open(2)` with the flags
+``O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC``.
+
+When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE``
+right is associated with the newly created file descriptor and will be used for
+subsequent truncation attempts using :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`. The behavior is
+similar to opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked
+during :manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and
+:manpage:`write(2)` calls.
+
+As a consequence, it is possible to have multiple open file descriptors for the
+same file, where one grants the right to truncate the file and the other does
+not. It is also possible to pass such file descriptors between processes,
+keeping their Landlock properties, even when these processes do not have an
+enforced Landlock ruleset.
+
Compatibility
=============
@@ -397,6 +440,15 @@ Starting with the Landlock ABI version 2, it is now possible to securely
control renaming and linking thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`
access right.
+File truncation (ABI < 3)
+-------------------------
+
+File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is
+always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI.
+
+Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control
+truncation thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` access right.
+
.. _kernel_support:
Kernel support
--
2.37.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-01 15:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-01 15:48 [PATCH v8 0/9] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 1/9] security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:53 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 7:45 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-06 1:10 ` Paul Moore
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 2/9] selftests/landlock: Locally define __maybe_unused Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:53 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 7:47 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 3/9] landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into is_access_to_paths_allowed() Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 7:54 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 4/9] landlock: Support file truncation Günther Noack
2022-10-04 19:56 ` Nathan Chancellor
2022-10-05 18:52 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-06 20:19 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 8:08 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 5/9] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 6/9] selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 7/9] selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from a Landlock-restricted to an unrestricted process Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 8:25 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 8/9] samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 8:47 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2022-10-05 18:57 ` [PATCH v8 9/9] landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 8:49 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-05 19:18 ` [PATCH v8 0/9] landlock: truncate support Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 10:20 ` Günther Noack
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