From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: fsverity@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] fsverity: explicitly check for buffer overflow in build_merkle_tree()
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2023 21:15:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230328041505.110162-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The new Merkle tree construction algorithm is a bit fragile in that it
may overflow the 'root_hash' array if the tree actually generated does
not match the calculated tree parameters.
This should never happen unless there is a filesystem bug that allows
the file size to change despite deny_write_access(), or a bug in the
Merkle tree logic itself. Regardless, it's fairly easy to check for
buffer overflow here, so let's do so.
This is a robustness improvement only; this case is not currently known
to be reachable. I've added a Fixes tag anyway, since I recommend that
this be included in kernels that have the mentioned commit.
Fixes: 56124d6c87fd ("fsverity: support enabling with tree block size < PAGE_SIZE")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
fs/verity/enable.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c
index 7a0e3a84d370b..30012e734a77a 100644
--- a/fs/verity/enable.c
+++ b/fs/verity/enable.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
struct block_buffer {
u32 filled;
+ bool is_root_hash;
u8 *data;
};
@@ -24,6 +25,14 @@ static int hash_one_block(struct inode *inode,
struct block_buffer *next = cur + 1;
int err;
+ /*
+ * Safety check to prevent a buffer overflow in case of a filesystem bug
+ * that allows the file size to change despite deny_write_access(), or a
+ * bug in the Merkle tree logic itself
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next->is_root_hash && next->filled != 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* Zero-pad the block if it's shorter than the block size. */
memset(&cur->data[cur->filled], 0, params->block_size - cur->filled);
@@ -97,6 +106,7 @@ static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp,
}
}
buffers[num_levels].data = root_hash;
+ buffers[num_levels].is_root_hash = true;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(level_offset) != sizeof(params->level_start));
memcpy(level_offset, params->level_start, sizeof(level_offset));
base-commit: 2da81b8479434c62a9ae189ec24729445f74b6a9
--
2.40.0
reply other threads:[~2023-03-28 4:15 UTC|newest]
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