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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.4 07/16] fs: Protect reconfiguration of sb read-write from racing writes
Date: Sun,  2 Jul 2023 15:38:06 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230702193815.1775684-7-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230702193815.1775684-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

[ Upstream commit c541dce86c537714b6761a79a969c1623dfa222b ]

The reconfigure / remount code takes a lot of effort to protect
filesystem's reconfiguration code from racing writes on remounting
read-only. However during remounting read-only filesystem to read-write
mode userspace writes can start immediately once we clear SB_RDONLY
flag. This is inconvenient for example for ext4 because we need to do
some writes to the filesystem (such as preparation of quota files)
before we can take userspace writes so we are clearing SB_RDONLY flag
before we are fully ready to accept userpace writes and syzbot has found
a way to exploit this [1]. Also as far as I'm reading the code
the filesystem remount code was protected from racing writes in the
legacy mount path by the mount's MNT_READONLY flag so this is relatively
new problem. It is actually fairly easy to protect remount read-write
from racing writes using sb->s_readonly_remount flag so let's just do
that instead of having to workaround these races in the filesystem code.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000006a0df05f6667499@google.com/T/

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230615113848.8439-1-jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/super.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index 09668ddfbbd55..860d7a4b14c7c 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -903,6 +903,7 @@ int reconfigure_super(struct fs_context *fc)
 	struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
 	int retval;
 	bool remount_ro = false;
+	bool remount_rw = false;
 	bool force = fc->sb_flags & SB_FORCE;
 
 	if (fc->sb_flags_mask & ~MS_RMT_MASK)
@@ -920,7 +921,7 @@ int reconfigure_super(struct fs_context *fc)
 		    bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev))
 			return -EACCES;
 #endif
-
+		remount_rw = !(fc->sb_flags & SB_RDONLY) && sb_rdonly(sb);
 		remount_ro = (fc->sb_flags & SB_RDONLY) && !sb_rdonly(sb);
 	}
 
@@ -950,6 +951,14 @@ int reconfigure_super(struct fs_context *fc)
 			if (retval)
 				return retval;
 		}
+	} else if (remount_rw) {
+		/*
+		 * We set s_readonly_remount here to protect filesystem's
+		 * reconfigure code from writes from userspace until
+		 * reconfigure finishes.
+		 */
+		sb->s_readonly_remount = 1;
+		smp_wmb();
 	}
 
 	if (fc->ops->reconfigure) {
-- 
2.39.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-07-02 19:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-07-02 19:38 [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.4 01/16] vfs: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpy Sasha Levin
2023-07-02 19:38 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.4 02/16] coredump: require O_WRONLY instead of O_RDWR Sasha Levin
2023-07-02 19:38 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.4 03/16] fs: use UB-safe check for signed addition overflow in remap_verify_area Sasha Levin
2023-07-02 19:38 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2023-07-02 19:38 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.4 11/16] fs: use correct __poll_t type Sasha Levin
2023-07-02 19:38 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.4 12/16] fs.h: Optimize file struct to prevent false sharing Sasha Levin
2023-07-02 19:38 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.4 13/16] fs: unexport buffer_check_dirty_writeback Sasha Levin
2023-07-02 19:38 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.4 14/16] eventfd: show the EFD_SEMAPHORE flag in fdinfo Sasha Levin
2023-07-02 19:38 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.4 16/16] fs: Provide helpers for manipulating sb->s_readonly_remount Sasha Levin

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