From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org,
chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de,
kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 22/23] integrity: Move integrity functions to the LSM infrastructure
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 10:42:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231027084234.485243-3-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231027083558.484911-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Remove hardcoded calls to integrity functions from the LSM infrastructure
and, instead, register them in integrity_lsm_init() with the IMA or EVM
LSM ID (the first non-NULL returned by ima_get_lsm_id() and
evm_get_lsm_id()).
Also move the global declaration of integrity_inode_get() to
security/integrity/integrity.h, so that the function can be still called by
IMA.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
include/linux/integrity.h | 26 --------------------------
security/integrity/iint.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/integrity.h | 7 +++++++
security/security.c | 9 +--------
4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 2ea0f2f65ab6..afaae7ad26f4 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -21,38 +21,12 @@ enum integrity_status {
/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
-extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
-extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void);
#else
-static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
- integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
-{
- return;
-}
-
static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
{
}
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
-#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
-
-extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-
-#else
-
-static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
-
#endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 3d9cf5041739..31a0fda3f1a1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
*
* Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode.
*/
-void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+static void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -193,11 +193,39 @@ static void iint_init_once(void *foo)
memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
}
+static struct security_hook_list integrity_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, integrity_inode_free),
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, integrity_kernel_module_request),
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * Perform the initialization of the 'integrity', 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs to
+ * ensure that the management of integrity metadata is working at the time
+ * IMA and EVM hooks are registered to the LSM infrastructure, and to keep
+ * the original ordering of IMA and EVM functions as when they were hardcoded.
+ */
static int __init integrity_lsm_init(void)
{
+ const struct lsm_id *lsmid;
+
iint_cache =
kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once);
+ /*
+ * Obtain either the IMA or EVM LSM ID to register integrity-specific
+ * hooks under that LSM, since there is no LSM ID assigned to the
+ * 'integrity' LSM.
+ */
+ lsmid = ima_get_lsm_id();
+ if (!lsmid)
+ lsmid = evm_get_lsm_id();
+ /* No point in continuing, since both IMA and EVM are disabled. */
+ if (!lsmid)
+ return 0;
+
+ security_add_hooks(integrity_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(integrity_hooks), lsmid);
init_ima_lsm();
init_evm_lsm();
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 7534ec06324e..e4df82d6f6e7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
* integrity data associated with an inode.
*/
struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
+struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
void *addr, unsigned long count);
@@ -266,12 +267,18 @@ static inline int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id,
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
int siglen, const char *data, int datalen);
+int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
#else
static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+
+static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5bbeedd534b6..c70664c947be 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
-#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
@@ -1590,7 +1589,6 @@ static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
*/
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
- integrity_inode_free(inode);
call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
/*
* The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
@@ -3175,12 +3173,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
*/
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
}
/**
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-27 8:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-27 8:35 [PATCH v4 00/23] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 01/23] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 02/23] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 03/23] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 04/23] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 05/23] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 06/23] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 07/23] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 08/23] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 09/23] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 10/23] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 11/23] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 12/23] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-06 16:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 13/23] security: Introduce file_pre_free_security hook Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 14/23] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 15/23] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 16/23] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 17/23] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-06 16:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 18/23] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:35 ` [PATCH v4 19/23] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:42 ` [PATCH v4 20/23] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-06 16:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-27 8:42 ` [PATCH v4 21/23] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2023-10-27 8:42 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-10-27 8:42 ` [PATCH v4 23/23] integrity: Switch from rbtree to LSM-managed blob for integrity_iint_cache Roberto Sassu
2023-11-06 16:37 ` [PATCH v4 00/23] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Mimi Zohar
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