From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
<paul@paul-moore.com>, <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <keescook@chromium.org>,
<kernel-team@meta.com>, <sargun@sargun.me>
Subject: [PATCH v9 bpf-next 01/17] bpf: align CAP_NET_ADMIN checks with bpf_capable() approach
Date: Fri, 3 Nov 2023 12:05:07 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231103190523.6353-2-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231103190523.6353-1-andrii@kernel.org>
Within BPF syscall handling code CAP_NET_ADMIN checks stand out a bit
compared to CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON checks. For the latter, CAP_BPF or
CAP_PERFMON are checked first, but if they are not set, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
takes over and grants whatever part of BPF syscall is required.
Similar kind of checks that involve CAP_NET_ADMIN are not so consistent.
One out of four uses does follow CAP_BPF/CAP_PERFMON model: during
BPF_PROG_LOAD, if the type of BPF program is "network-related" either
CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to proceed.
But in three other cases CAP_NET_ADMIN is required even if CAP_SYS_ADMIN
is set:
- when creating DEVMAP/XDKMAP/CPU_MAP maps;
- when attaching CGROUP_SKB programs;
- when handling BPF_PROG_QUERY command.
This patch is changing the latter three cases to follow BPF_PROG_LOAD
model, that is allowing to proceed under either CAP_NET_ADMIN or
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This also makes it cleaner in subsequent BPF token patches to switch
wholesomely to a generic bpf_token_capable(int cap) check, that always
falls back to CAP_SYS_ADMIN if requested capability is missing.
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 0ed286b8a0f0..ad4d8e433ccc 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1096,6 +1096,11 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
return ret;
}
+static bool bpf_net_capable(void)
+{
+ return capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_extra
/* called via syscall */
static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
@@ -1199,7 +1204,7 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!bpf_net_capable())
return -EPERM;
break;
default:
@@ -2599,7 +2604,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
!bpf_capable())
return -EPERM;
- if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !bpf_net_capable())
return -EPERM;
if (is_perfmon_prog_type(type) && !perfmon_capable())
return -EPERM;
@@ -3751,7 +3756,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
return attach_type == prog->expected_attach_type ? 0 : -EINVAL;
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!bpf_net_capable())
/* cg-skb progs can be loaded by unpriv user.
* check permissions at attach time.
*/
@@ -3954,7 +3959,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr)
static int bpf_prog_query(const union bpf_attr *attr,
union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!bpf_net_capable())
return -EPERM;
if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_PROG_QUERY))
return -EINVAL;
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-03 19:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-03 19:05 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 00/17] BPF token and BPF FS-based delegation Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2023-11-05 6:33 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 01/17] bpf: align CAP_NET_ADMIN checks with bpf_capable() approach Yafang Shao
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 02/17] bpf: add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-08 13:51 ` Christian Brauner
2023-11-08 21:09 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-09 8:47 ` Christian Brauner
2023-11-09 17:09 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-09 22:29 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 03/17] bpf: introduce BPF token object Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-08 14:28 ` Christian Brauner
2023-11-08 21:09 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 04/17] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 05/17] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 06/17] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 07/17] bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 08/17] bpf: consistently use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 09/17] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-06 5:01 ` [PATCH v9 9/17] " Paul Moore
2023-11-06 19:03 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-06 22:29 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 10/17] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free " Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-06 5:01 ` [PATCH v9 " Paul Moore
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 11/17] bpf,lsm: add BPF token " Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-04 0:36 ` kernel test robot
2023-11-04 3:20 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-06 5:01 ` [PATCH v9 " Paul Moore
2023-11-06 19:17 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-06 22:46 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 12/17] libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 13/17] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 14/17] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 15/17] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 16/17] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled tests Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 17/17] bpf,selinux: allocate bpf_security_struct per BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-06 5:01 ` [PATCH v9 " Paul Moore
2023-11-06 19:18 ` Andrii Nakryiko
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