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From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] fsnotify: pass access range in file permission hooks
Date: Thu,  7 Dec 2023 14:38:25 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231207123825.4011620-5-amir73il@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231207123825.4011620-1-amir73il@gmail.com>

In preparation for pre-content permission events with file access range,
move fsnotify_file_perm() hook out of security_file_permission() and into
the callers that have the access range information and pass the access
range to fsnotify_file_perm().

Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
---
 fs/open.c                |  4 ++++
 fs/read_write.c          | 10 ++++++++--
 fs/readdir.c             |  4 ++++
 fs/remap_range.c         |  8 +++++++-
 include/linux/fsnotify.h |  3 ++-
 security/security.c      |  8 +-------
 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 02dc608d40d8..530f70da69e1 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -304,6 +304,10 @@ int vfs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	ret = fsnotify_file_perm(file, MAY_WRITE, &offset, len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	if (S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode))
 		return -ESPIPE;
 
diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
index 97a9d5c7ad96..1b5b0883edba 100644
--- a/fs/read_write.c
+++ b/fs/read_write.c
@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(llseek, unsigned int, fd, unsigned long, offset_high,
 
 int rw_verify_area(int read_write, struct file *file, const loff_t *ppos, size_t count)
 {
+	int mask = read_write == READ ? MAY_READ : MAY_WRITE;
+	int ret;
+
 	if (unlikely((ssize_t) count < 0))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -371,8 +374,11 @@ int rw_verify_area(int read_write, struct file *file, const loff_t *ppos, size_t
 		}
 	}
 
-	return security_file_permission(file,
-				read_write == READ ? MAY_READ : MAY_WRITE);
+	ret = security_file_permission(file, mask);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return fsnotify_file_perm(file, mask, ppos, count);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(rw_verify_area);
 
diff --git a/fs/readdir.c b/fs/readdir.c
index c8c46e294431..684ae75d94a4 100644
--- a/fs/readdir.c
+++ b/fs/readdir.c
@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ int iterate_dir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 	if (res)
 		goto out;
 
+	res = fsnotify_file_perm(file, MAY_READ, NULL, 0);
+	if (res)
+		goto out;
+
 	res = down_read_killable(&inode->i_rwsem);
 	if (res)
 		goto out;
diff --git a/fs/remap_range.c b/fs/remap_range.c
index 12131f2a6c9e..ee4729aafbde 100644
--- a/fs/remap_range.c
+++ b/fs/remap_range.c
@@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ static int generic_remap_checks(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
 static int remap_verify_area(struct file *file, loff_t pos, loff_t len,
 			     bool write)
 {
+	int mask = write ? MAY_WRITE : MAY_READ;
 	loff_t tmp;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (unlikely(pos < 0 || len < 0))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -110,7 +112,11 @@ static int remap_verify_area(struct file *file, loff_t pos, loff_t len,
 	if (unlikely(check_add_overflow(pos, len, &tmp)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return security_file_permission(file, write ? MAY_WRITE : MAY_READ);
+	ret = security_file_permission(file, mask);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return fsnotify_file_perm(file, mask, &pos, len);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
index 0a9d6a8a747a..45e6ecbca057 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
@@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ static inline int fsnotify_file(struct file *file, __u32 mask)
 /*
  * fsnotify_file_perm - permission hook before file access
  */
-static inline int fsnotify_file_perm(struct file *file, int perm_mask)
+static inline int fsnotify_file_perm(struct file *file, int perm_mask,
+				     const loff_t *ppos, size_t count)
 {
 	__u32 fsnotify_mask = FS_ACCESS_PERM;
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d7f3703c5905..2a7fc7881cbc 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2580,13 +2580,7 @@ int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
  */
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	return fsnotify_file_perm(file, mask);
+	return call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-12-07 12:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-07 12:38 [PATCH 0/4] Prepare for fsnotify pre-content permission events Amir Goldstein
2023-12-07 12:38 ` [PATCH 1/4] fs: use splice_copy_file_range() inline helper Amir Goldstein
2023-12-08 17:33   ` Christian Brauner
2023-12-10 10:07     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-08 18:27   ` Jan Kara
2023-12-07 12:38 ` [PATCH 2/4] fsnotify: split fsnotify_perm() into two hooks Amir Goldstein
2023-12-08 18:33   ` Jan Kara
2023-12-07 12:38 ` [PATCH 3/4] fsnotify: assert that file_start_write() is not held in permission hooks Amir Goldstein
2023-12-08 18:46   ` Jan Kara
2023-12-08 21:02     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-11 10:30       ` Jan Kara
2023-12-11 10:57         ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-07 12:38 ` Amir Goldstein [this message]
2023-12-08 17:52   ` [PATCH 4/4] fsnotify: pass access range in file " Christian Brauner
2023-12-08 18:53   ` Jan Kara
2023-12-08 21:34     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-10 13:24       ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-11 11:49         ` Jan Kara
2023-12-11 12:00           ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-11 14:53             ` Jan Kara
2023-12-07 21:51 ` [PATCH 0/4] Prepare for fsnotify pre-content permission events Josef Bacik
2023-12-08  7:34   ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-15 17:00     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-15 20:04       ` Josef Bacik
2023-12-08 17:54 ` Christian Brauner

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