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From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
To: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] fsnotify: assert that file_start_write() is not held in permission hooks
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 19:46:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231208184608.n5fcrkj3peancy3u@quack3> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231207123825.4011620-4-amir73il@gmail.com>

On Thu 07-12-23 14:38:24, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> filesystem may be modified in the context of fanotify permission events
> (e.g. by HSM service), so assert that sb freeze protection is not held.
> 
> If the assertion fails, then the following deadlock would be possible:
> 
> CPU0				CPU1			CPU2
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> file_start_write()#0
> ...
>   fsnotify_perm()
>     fanotify_get_response() =>	(read event and fill file)
> 				...
> 				...			freeze_super()
> 				...			  sb_wait_write()
> 				...
> 				vfs_write()
> 				  file_start_write()#1
> 
> This example demonstrates a use case of an hierarchical storage management
> (HSM) service that uses fanotify permission events to fill the content of
> a file before access, while a 3rd process starts fsfreeze.
> 
> This creates a circular dependeny:
>   file_start_write()#0 => fanotify_get_response =>
>     file_start_write()#1 =>
>       sb_wait_write() =>
>         file_end_write()#0
> 
> Where file_end_write()#0 can never be called and none of the threads can
> make progress.
> 
> The assertion is checked for both MAY_READ and MAY_WRITE permission
> hooks in preparation for a pre-modify permission event.
> 
> The assertion is not checked for an open permission event, because
> do_open() takes mnt_want_write() in O_TRUNC case, meaning that it is not
> safe to write to filesystem in the content of an open permission event.
				     ^^^^^ context

BTW, isn't this a bit inconvenient? I mean filling file contents on open
looks quite natural... Do you plan to fill files only on individual read /
write events? I was under the impression simple HSM handlers would be doing
it on open.
 
> Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>

Anyway this particular change looks good. Feel free to add:

Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

								Honza

> ---
>  include/linux/fsnotify.h | 7 +++++++
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
> index 926bb4461b9e..0a9d6a8a747a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
> @@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ static inline int fsnotify_file_perm(struct file *file, int perm_mask)
>  {
>  	__u32 fsnotify_mask = FS_ACCESS_PERM;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * filesystem may be modified in the context of permission events
> +	 * (e.g. by HSM filling a file on access), so sb freeze protection
> +	 * must not be held.
> +	 */
> +	lockdep_assert_once(file_write_not_started(file));
> +
>  	if (!(perm_mask & MAY_READ))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 
-- 
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
SUSE Labs, CR

  reply	other threads:[~2023-12-08 18:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-07 12:38 [PATCH 0/4] Prepare for fsnotify pre-content permission events Amir Goldstein
2023-12-07 12:38 ` [PATCH 1/4] fs: use splice_copy_file_range() inline helper Amir Goldstein
2023-12-08 17:33   ` Christian Brauner
2023-12-10 10:07     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-08 18:27   ` Jan Kara
2023-12-07 12:38 ` [PATCH 2/4] fsnotify: split fsnotify_perm() into two hooks Amir Goldstein
2023-12-08 18:33   ` Jan Kara
2023-12-07 12:38 ` [PATCH 3/4] fsnotify: assert that file_start_write() is not held in permission hooks Amir Goldstein
2023-12-08 18:46   ` Jan Kara [this message]
2023-12-08 21:02     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-11 10:30       ` Jan Kara
2023-12-11 10:57         ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-07 12:38 ` [PATCH 4/4] fsnotify: pass access range in file " Amir Goldstein
2023-12-08 17:52   ` Christian Brauner
2023-12-08 18:53   ` Jan Kara
2023-12-08 21:34     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-10 13:24       ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-11 11:49         ` Jan Kara
2023-12-11 12:00           ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-11 14:53             ` Jan Kara
2023-12-07 21:51 ` [PATCH 0/4] Prepare for fsnotify pre-content permission events Josef Bacik
2023-12-08  7:34   ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-15 17:00     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-12-15 20:04       ` Josef Bacik
2023-12-08 17:54 ` Christian Brauner

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