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From: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
To: linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>,
	david@fromorbit.com, mcgrof@kernel.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, hch@lst.de, willy@infradead.org,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fs: file_remove_privs_flags()
Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 01:30:07 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240229063010.68754-2-kent.overstreet@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240229063010.68754-1-kent.overstreet@linux.dev>

Rename and export __file_remove_privs(); for a buffered write path that
doesn't take the inode lock we need to be able to check if the operation
needs to do work first.

Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
 fs/inode.c         | 7 ++++---
 include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index 91048c4c9c9e..b465afdbfcef 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -2031,7 +2031,7 @@ static int __remove_privs(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	return notify_change(idmap, dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
 }
 
-static int __file_remove_privs(struct file *file, unsigned int flags)
+int file_remove_privs_flags(struct file *file, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -2056,6 +2056,7 @@ static int __file_remove_privs(struct file *file, unsigned int flags)
 		inode_has_no_xattr(inode);
 	return error;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(file_remove_privs_flags);
 
 /**
  * file_remove_privs - remove special file privileges (suid, capabilities)
@@ -2068,7 +2069,7 @@ static int __file_remove_privs(struct file *file, unsigned int flags)
  */
 int file_remove_privs(struct file *file)
 {
-	return __file_remove_privs(file, 0);
+	return file_remove_privs_flags(file, 0);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_remove_privs);
 
@@ -2161,7 +2162,7 @@ static int file_modified_flags(struct file *file, int flags)
 	 * Clear the security bits if the process is not being run by root.
 	 * This keeps people from modifying setuid and setgid binaries.
 	 */
-	ret = __file_remove_privs(file, flags);
+	ret = file_remove_privs_flags(file, flags);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 1fbc72c5f112..14ea66b62823 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -3004,6 +3004,7 @@ extern struct inode *new_inode_pseudo(struct super_block *sb);
 extern struct inode *new_inode(struct super_block *sb);
 extern void free_inode_nonrcu(struct inode *inode);
 extern int setattr_should_drop_suidgid(struct mnt_idmap *, struct inode *);
+extern int file_remove_privs_flags(struct file *file, unsigned int flags);
 extern int file_remove_privs(struct file *);
 int setattr_should_drop_sgid(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			     const struct inode *inode);
-- 
2.43.0


  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-29  6:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-29  6:30 [PATCH 0/2] buffered write path without inode lock (for bcachefs) Kent Overstreet
2024-02-29  6:30 ` Kent Overstreet [this message]
2024-02-29  6:30 ` [PATCH 2/2] bcachefs: Buffered write path now can avoid the inode lock Kent Overstreet
2024-02-29  7:20   ` Linus Torvalds
2024-02-29  7:27     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-02-29  8:06       ` Kent Overstreet
2024-02-29  9:46       ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-29 16:43         ` Kent Overstreet
2024-02-29  7:42     ` Kent Overstreet

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