From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
jack@suse.cz, david@fromorbit.com, amir73il@gmail.com,
hch@lst.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH][RFC] fs: add levels to inode write access
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 14:32:29 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240531-beheben-panzerglas-5ba2472a3330@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240531-ausdiskutiert-wortgefecht-f90dca685f8c@brauner>
On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 12:02:16PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 08:49:12AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > On Thu, 30 May 2024 at 03:32, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Ofc depends on whether Linus still agrees that removing this might be
> > > something we could try.
> >
> > I _definitely_ do not want to see any more complex deny_write_access().
> >
> > So yes, if people have good reasons to override the inode write
> > access, I'd rather remove it entirely than make it some eldritch
> > horror that is even worse than what we have now.
> >
> > It would obviously have to be tested in case some odd case actually
> > depends on the ETXTBSY semantics, since we *have* supported it for a
> > long time. But iirc nobody even noticed when we removed it from
> > shared libraries, so...
> >
> > That said, verity seems to depend on it as a way to do the
> > "enable_verity()" atomically with no concurrent writes, and I see some
> > i_writecount noise in the integrity code too.
> >
> > But maybe that's just a belt-and-suspenders thing?
> >
> > Because if execve() no longer does it, I think we should just remove
> > that i_writecount thing entirely.
>
> deny_write_access() is being used from kernel_read_file() which has a
> few wrappers around it and they are used in various places:
>
> (1) kernel_read_file() based helpers:
> (1.1) kernel_read_file_from_path()
> (1.2) kernel_read_file_from_path_initns()
> (1.3) kernel_read_file_from_fd()
>
> (2) kernel_read_file() users:
> (2.1) kernel/module/main.c:init_module_from_file()
> (2.2) security/loadpin/loadpin.c:read_trusted_verity_root_digests()
>
> (3) kernel_read_file_from_path() users:
> (3.1) security/integrity/digsig.c:integrity_load_x509()
> (3.2) security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c:ima_read_busy()
>
> (4) kernel_read_file_from_path_initns() users:
> (4.1) drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c:fw_get_filesystem_firmware()
>
> (5) kernel_read_file_from_fd() users:
> (5.1) kernel/kexec_file.c:kimage_file_prepare_segments()
>
> In order to remove i_writecount completely we would need to do this in
Sorry, typo s/i_write_count/deny_write_access()/g
(I don't think we can remove i_writecount itself as it's used for file
leases and locks.)
> multiple steps as some of that stuff seems potentially sensitive.
>
> The exec deny write mechanism can be removed because we have a decent
> understanding of the implications and there's decent justification for
> removing it.
>
> So I propose that I do various testing (LTP) etc. now, send the patch
> and then put this into -next to see if anything breaks?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-31 12:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-29 20:41 [PATCH][RFC] fs: add levels to inode write access Josef Bacik
2024-05-29 22:00 ` Jeff Layton
2024-05-30 1:14 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-05-30 10:32 ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-30 12:57 ` Amir Goldstein
2024-05-30 14:58 ` Josef Bacik
2024-05-30 15:23 ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-30 15:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-31 10:02 ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-31 12:32 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2024-05-31 13:01 ` [PATCH] fs: don't block i_writecount during exec Christian Brauner
2024-05-31 15:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-31 18:08 ` Jeff Layton
2024-05-31 22:08 ` Josef Bacik
2024-06-03 13:52 ` (subset) " Christian Brauner
2024-06-06 12:45 ` Aishwarya TCV
2024-06-06 15:37 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-06 16:53 ` Josef Bacik
2024-06-06 17:33 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-06 17:49 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-07 9:59 ` Tudor Ambarus
2024-09-04 17:04 ` Jann Horn
2024-09-05 7:38 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-05-31 13:09 ` [PATCH][RFC] fs: add levels to inode write access Amir Goldstein
2024-05-31 14:50 ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-31 15:47 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-05-31 22:14 ` Matthew Wilcox
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