From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
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linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2024 22:42:37 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240709.aech3geeMoh0@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALmYWFuFE=V7sGp0_K+2Vuk6F0chzhJY88CP1CAE9jtd=rqcoQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jul 08, 2024 at 03:07:24PM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 8, 2024 at 2:25 PM Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org> wrote:
> >
> > On 08/07/2024 22:15, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > > IIUC:
> > > CHECK=0, RESTRICT=0: do nothing, current behavior
> > > CHECK=1, RESTRICT=0: permissive mode - ignore AT_CHECK results.
> > > CHECK=0, RESTRICT=1: call AT_CHECK, deny if AT_CHECK failed, no exception.
> > > CHECK=1, RESTRICT=1: call AT_CHECK, deny if AT_CHECK failed, except
> > > those in the "checked-and-allowed" list.
> >
> > I had much the same question for Mickaël while working on this.
> >
> > Essentially, "CHECK=0, RESTRICT=1" means to restrict without checking.
> > In the context of a script or macro interpreter, this just means it will
> > never interpret any scripts. Non-binary code execution is fully disabled
> > in any part of the process that respects these bits.
> >
> I see, so Mickaël does mean this will block all scripts.
That is the initial idea.
> I guess, in the context of dynamic linker, this means: no more .so
> loading, even "dlopen" is called by an app ? But this will make the
> execve() fail.
Hmm, I'm not sure this "CHECK=0, RESTRICT=1" configuration would make
sense for a dynamic linker except maybe if we want to only allow static
binaries?
The CHECK and RESTRICT securebits are designed to make it possible a
"permissive mode" and an enforcement mode with the related locked
securebits. This is why this "CHECK=0, RESTRICT=1" combination looks a
bit weird. We can replace these securebits with others but I didn't
find a better (and simple) option. I don't think this is an issue
because with any security policy we can create unusable combinations.
The three other combinations makes a lot of sense though.
>
> > "CHECK=1, RESTRICT=1" means to restrict unless AT_CHECK passes. This
> > case is the allow list (or whatever mechanism is being used to determine
> > the result of an AT_CHECK check). The actual mechanism isn't the
> > business of the script interpreter at all, it just has to refuse to
> > execute anything that doesn't pass the check. So a generic interpreter
> > can implement a generic mechanism and leave the specifics to whoever
> > configures the machine.
> >
> In the context of dynamic linker. this means:
> if .so passed the AT_CHECK, ldopen() can still load it.
> If .so fails the AT_CHECK, ldopen() will fail too.
Correct
>
> Thanks
> -Jeff
>
> > The other two case are more obvious. "CHECK=0, RESTRICT=0" is the
> > zero-overhead case, while "CHECK=1, RESTRICT=0" might log, warn, or
> > otherwise audit the result of the check, but it won't restrict execution.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Steve
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-09 20:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-04 19:01 [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05 0:04 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 17:53 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 19:38 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 18:03 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-06 14:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 15:32 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 8:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:37 ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)) Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 17:34 ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC Eric W. Biederman
2024-07-08 17:59 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-10 10:05 ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 16:25 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 16:40 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 17:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 17:33 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 17:52 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 9:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 10:05 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-09 20:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 18:57 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 20:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 8:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-07 9:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-17 6:33 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-17 8:26 ` Steve Dower
2024-07-17 10:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 1:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-18 12:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-20 1:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-20 11:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-23 13:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-23 13:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 1:51 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-18 12:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 22:54 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-17 10:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 2:08 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-18 12:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 13:03 ` James Bottomley
2024-07-18 15:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 1:29 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 8:44 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 14:16 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 15:27 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-23 13:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-05 18:35 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-09 8:45 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-09 16:15 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:12 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 17:36 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-23 13:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 14:46 ` enh
2024-07-18 15:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 17:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 22:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-06 14:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 17:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-06 14:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 14:16 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-07-18 16:20 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:17 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 17:53 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 18:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 21:15 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 21:25 ` Steve Dower
2024-07-08 22:07 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 20:42 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2024-07-09 21:57 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-10 9:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-10 16:26 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-11 8:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:02 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-16 15:10 ` Steve Dower
2024-07-16 15:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:18 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-10 16:32 ` Steve Dower
2024-07-20 2:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-23 13:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 3/5] selftests/exec: Add tests for AT_CHECK and related securebits Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 4/5] selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_CHECK Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 5/5] samples/should-exec: Add set-should-exec Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 19:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-07-09 20:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 20:35 ` [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC) Mimi Zohar
2024-07-09 20:43 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:57 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-07-16 16:12 ` James Bottomley
2024-07-16 17:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 16:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
[not found] ` <E608EDB8-72E8-4791-AC9B-8FF9AC753FBE@sempervictus.com>
2024-07-16 17:47 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-17 17:59 ` Boris Lukashev
2024-07-18 13:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-15 20:16 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-07-16 7:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
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