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From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	 Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,  Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	 Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 18/20] fs: add f_pipe
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2024 15:04:59 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240830-vfs-file-f_version-v1-18-6d3e4816aa7b@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240830-vfs-file-f_version-v1-0-6d3e4816aa7b@kernel.org>

Only regular files with FMODE_ATOMIC_POS and directories need
f_pos_lock. Place a new f_pipe member in a union with f_pos_lock
that they can use and make them stop abusing f_version in follow-up
patches.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/fs.h | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3e6b3c1afb31..ca4925008244 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1001,6 +1001,7 @@ static inline int ra_has_index(struct file_ra_state *ra, pgoff_t index)
  * @f_cred: stashed credentials of creator/opener
  * @f_path: path of the file
  * @f_pos_lock: lock protecting file position
+ * @f_pipe: specific to pipes
  * @f_pos: file position
  * @f_version: file version
  * @f_security: LSM security context of this file
@@ -1026,7 +1027,12 @@ struct file {
 	const struct cred		*f_cred;
 	/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
 	struct path			f_path;
-	struct mutex			f_pos_lock;
+	union {
+		/* regular files (with FMODE_ATOMIC_POS) and directories */
+		struct mutex		f_pos_lock;
+		/* pipes */
+		u64			f_pipe;
+	};
 	loff_t				f_pos;
 	u64				f_version;
 	/* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) --- */

-- 
2.45.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-08-30 13:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-30 13:04 [PATCH RFC 00/20] file: remove f_version Christian Brauner
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 01/20] file: remove pointless comment Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 10:28   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 02/20] adi: remove unused f_version Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 10:30   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 03/20] ceph: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 10:30   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 04/20] s390: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 10:31   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 05/20] fs: add vfs_setpos_cookie() Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:35   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 06/20] fs: add must_set_pos() Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:32   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 07/20] fs: use must_set_pos() Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:30   ` Jan Kara
2024-09-03 11:41     ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 08/20] fs: add generic_llseek_cookie() Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:34   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 09/20] affs: store cookie in private data Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:26   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 10/20] ext2: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:42   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 11/20] ext4: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-01 19:36   ` Theodore Ts'o
2024-09-03 11:37   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 12/20] input: remove f_version abuse Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:40   ` Jan Kara
2024-09-12  2:52   ` Lai, Yi
2024-09-12 10:02     ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 13/20] ocfs2: store cookie in private data Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:27   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 14/20] proc: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:34   ` Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:35     ` Jan Kara
2024-09-03 14:00       ` Christian Brauner
2024-09-04 14:16         ` Jan Kara
2024-09-05  9:28           ` Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:33   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 15/20] udf: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:37   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 16/20] ufs: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:38   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 17/20] ubifs: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:39   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2024-09-03 13:50   ` [PATCH RFC 18/20] fs: add f_pipe Jan Kara
2024-09-03 14:31     ` Christian Brauner
2024-09-04 14:08       ` Jan Kara
2024-09-04 14:21   ` Al Viro
2024-08-30 13:05 ` [PATCH RFC 19/20] pipe: use f_pipe Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:45   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:05 ` [PATCH RFC 20/20] fs: remove f_version Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:45   ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 14:04 ` [PATCH RFC 00/20] file: " Jeff Layton

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