From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 18/20] fs: add f_pipe
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2024 15:50:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240903135055.jhcusfiopheb2jej@quack3> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240830-vfs-file-f_version-v1-18-6d3e4816aa7b@kernel.org>
On Fri 30-08-24 15:04:59, Christian Brauner wrote:
> Only regular files with FMODE_ATOMIC_POS and directories need
> f_pos_lock. Place a new f_pipe member in a union with f_pos_lock
> that they can use and make them stop abusing f_version in follow-up
> patches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
What makes me a bit uneasy is that we do mutex_init() on the space in
struct file and then pipe_open() will clobber it. And then we eventually
call mutex_destroy() on the clobbered mutex. I think so far this does no
harm but mostly by luck. I think we need to make sure that when f_pos_lock
is unused, we don't even call mutex_init() / mutex_destroy() on it.
Honza
> ---
> include/linux/fs.h | 8 +++++++-
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 3e6b3c1afb31..ca4925008244 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -1001,6 +1001,7 @@ static inline int ra_has_index(struct file_ra_state *ra, pgoff_t index)
> * @f_cred: stashed credentials of creator/opener
> * @f_path: path of the file
> * @f_pos_lock: lock protecting file position
> + * @f_pipe: specific to pipes
> * @f_pos: file position
> * @f_version: file version
> * @f_security: LSM security context of this file
> @@ -1026,7 +1027,12 @@ struct file {
> const struct cred *f_cred;
> /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
> struct path f_path;
> - struct mutex f_pos_lock;
> + union {
> + /* regular files (with FMODE_ATOMIC_POS) and directories */
> + struct mutex f_pos_lock;
> + /* pipes */
> + u64 f_pipe;
> + };
> loff_t f_pos;
> u64 f_version;
> /* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) --- */
>
> --
> 2.45.2
>
--
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-03 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-30 13:04 [PATCH RFC 00/20] file: remove f_version Christian Brauner
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 01/20] file: remove pointless comment Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 10:28 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 02/20] adi: remove unused f_version Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 10:30 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 03/20] ceph: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 10:30 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 04/20] s390: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 10:31 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 05/20] fs: add vfs_setpos_cookie() Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:35 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 06/20] fs: add must_set_pos() Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:32 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 07/20] fs: use must_set_pos() Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:30 ` Jan Kara
2024-09-03 11:41 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 08/20] fs: add generic_llseek_cookie() Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:34 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 09/20] affs: store cookie in private data Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:26 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 10/20] ext2: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:42 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 11/20] ext4: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-01 19:36 ` Theodore Ts'o
2024-09-03 11:37 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 12/20] input: remove f_version abuse Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:40 ` Jan Kara
2024-09-12 2:52 ` Lai, Yi
2024-09-12 10:02 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 13/20] ocfs2: store cookie in private data Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:27 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 14/20] proc: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 11:34 ` Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:35 ` Jan Kara
2024-09-03 14:00 ` Christian Brauner
2024-09-04 14:16 ` Jan Kara
2024-09-05 9:28 ` Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:33 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 15/20] udf: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:37 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 16/20] ufs: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:38 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 17/20] ubifs: " Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:39 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:04 ` [PATCH RFC 18/20] fs: add f_pipe Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:50 ` Jan Kara [this message]
2024-09-03 14:31 ` Christian Brauner
2024-09-04 14:08 ` Jan Kara
2024-09-04 14:21 ` Al Viro
2024-08-30 13:05 ` [PATCH RFC 19/20] pipe: use f_pipe Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:45 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 13:05 ` [PATCH RFC 20/20] fs: remove f_version Christian Brauner
2024-09-03 13:45 ` Jan Kara
2024-08-30 14:04 ` [PATCH RFC 00/20] file: " Jeff Layton
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