From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>,
cve@kernel.org, gnoack@google.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
kent.overstreet@linux.dev, linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mic@digikod.net,
Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Unprivileged filesystem mounts
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2025 10:54:07 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250311175407.GC1268@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z8_Q4nOR5X3iZq3j@dread.disaster.area>
On Tue, Mar 11, 2025 at 04:57:54PM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote:
> And is this a real attack vector that Android must defend against,
> why isn't that device and filesystem image cryptographically signed
> and verified at boot time to prevent such attacks? That will prevent
> the entire class of malicious tampering exploits completely without
> having to care about undiscovered filesystem bugs - that's a much
> more robust solution from a verified boot and system security
> perspective...
That's exactly how it works. See
https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot and
https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/dm-verity.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-11 17:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2025030611-CVE-2025-21830-da64@gregkh>
[not found] ` <20250310.ooshu9Cha2oo@digikod.net>
[not found] ` <2025031034-savanna-debit-eb8e@gregkh>
2025-03-10 23:42 ` CVE-2025-21830: landlock: Handle weird files Dave Chinner
2025-03-11 2:09 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-11 4:24 ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-11 10:50 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-11 2:19 ` Unprivileged filesystem mounts Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-11 5:57 ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-11 11:01 ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-11 17:36 ` Al Viro
2025-03-11 17:43 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-11 17:54 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2025-03-11 20:10 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-18 5:21 ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-19 14:55 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-19 16:59 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-19 17:32 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-19 20:11 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-18 22:11 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-19 17:44 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-19 21:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-20 6:26 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-20 16:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-11 6:53 ` CVE-2025-21830: landlock: Handle weird files Greg Kroah-Hartman
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