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From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>,
	 Attila Szasz <szasza.contact@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 lvc-patches@linuxtesting.org, dutyrok@altlinux.org,
	 syzbot+5f3a973ed3dfb85a6683@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] hfs/hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read_key
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 19:15:26 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250407-kumpel-klirren-ad0db3c77321@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250407-biegung-furor-e7313ca9d712@brauner>

On Mon, Apr 07, 2025 at 12:59:18PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 06, 2025 at 07:07:57PM +0300, Cengiz Can wrote:
> > On 24-03-25 11:53:51, Greg KH wrote:
> > > On Mon, Mar 24, 2025 at 09:43:18PM +0300, Cengiz Can wrote:
> > > > In the meantime, can we get this fix applied?
> > > 
> > > Please work with the filesystem maintainers to do so.
> > 
> > Hello Christian, hello Alexander
> > 
> > Can you help us with this?
> > 
> > Thanks in advance!
> 
> Filesystem bugs due to corrupt images are not considered a CVE for any
> filesystem that is only mountable by CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user
> namespace. That includes delegated mounting.
> 
> Now, quoting from [1]:
> 
> "So, for the record, the Linux kernel in general only allows mounts for
> those with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, however, it is true that desktop and even
> server environments allow regular non-privileged users to mount and
> automount filesystems.
> 
> In particular, both the latest Ubuntu Desktop and Server versions come
> with default polkit rules that allow users with an active local session
> to create loop devices and mount a range of block filesystems commonly
> found on USB flash drives with udisks2. Inspecting
> /usr/share/polkit-1/actions/org.freedesktop.UDisks2.policy shows:"
> 
> So what this saying is:
> 
> A distribution is shipping tooling that allows unprivileged users to mount
> arbitrary filesystems including hpfsplus. Or to rephrase this: A
> distribution is allowing unprivileged users to mount orphaned
> filesystems. Congratulations on the brave decision to play Russian
> Roulette with a fully-loaded gun.
> 
> The VFS doesn't allow mounting arbitrary filesystems by unprivileged
> users. Every FS_REQUIRES_DEV filesystem requires global CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> privileged at which point you can also do sudo rm -rf --no-preserve-root /
> or a million other destructive things.
> 
> The blogpost is aware that the VFS maintainers don't accept CVEs like
> this. Yet a CVE was still filed against the upstream kernel. IOW,
> someone abused the fact that a distro chose to allow mounting arbitrary
> filesystems including orphaned ones by unprivileged user as an argument
> to gain a kernel CVE.
> 
> Revoke that CVE against the upstream kernel. This is a CVE against a
> distro. There's zero reason for us to hurry with any fix.

Before that gets misinterpreted: This is not intended to either
implicitly or explicitly imply that patch pickup is dependend on the
revocation of this CVE.

Since this isn't a valid CVE there's no reason to hurry-up merging this
into mainline within the next 24 hours. It'll get there whenever the
next fixes pr is ready.

> 
> [1]: https://ssd-disclosure.com/ssd-advisory-linux-kernel-hfsplus-slab-out-of-bounds-write/

  reply	other threads:[~2025-04-07 17:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-19 19:13 [PATCH] hfs/hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read_key Vasiliy Kovalev
2025-03-20 19:30 ` Salvatore Bonaccorso
2025-03-24 16:14   ` Cengiz Can
2025-03-24 16:17     ` Greg KH
2025-03-24 18:43       ` Cengiz Can
2025-03-24 18:53         ` Greg KH
2025-04-06 16:07           ` Cengiz Can
2025-04-06 16:28             ` Greg KH
2025-04-07 10:59             ` Christian Brauner
2025-04-07 17:15               ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2025-04-07 17:29                 ` Attila Szasz
2025-04-07 19:08               ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-04-08 10:11                 ` Richard Weinberger
2025-04-08 14:50                   ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-04-08 15:58                     ` Richard Weinberger
2025-04-16 15:10                   ` Eric Sandeen
2025-04-08  8:03               ` Greg KH
2025-04-08 12:00                 ` Attila Szasz
2025-03-27 19:15       ` Attila Szasz
2025-04-07 17:25 ` Christian Brauner

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