From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH][RFC] do_lock_mount() races in 'beneath' case
Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 04:14:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250422031448.GY2023217@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250421170319.GX2023217@ZenIV>
On Mon, Apr 21, 2025 at 06:03:19PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 21, 2025 at 05:29:47PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
>
> > What's to prevent the 'beneath' case from getting mnt mount --move'd
> > away *AND* the ex-parent from getting unmounted while we are blocked
> > in inode_lock? At this point we are not holding any locks whatsoever
> > (and all mount-related locks nest inside inode_lock(), so we couldn't
> > hold them there anyway).
> >
> > Hit that race and watch a very unhappy umount...
>
> While we are at it, in normal case inode_unlock() in unlock_mount()
> is safe since we have dentry (and associated mount) pinned by
> struct path we'd fed to matching lock_mount(). No longer true for
> the 'beneath' case, AFAICS...
Completely untested patch follows; 'beneath' case in do_lock_mount() is made
to grab mount reference to match the dentry one (same lifetime; dropped
simultaneously), unlock_mount() unlocks the inode *before* namespace_unlock(),
so we don't depend upon the externally held references.
Comments?
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index fa17762268f5..91d28f283f1c 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2827,56 +2827,62 @@ static struct mountpoint *do_lock_mount(struct path *path, bool beneath)
struct vfsmount *mnt = path->mnt;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct mountpoint *mp = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+ struct path under = {};
for (;;) {
- struct mount *m;
+ struct mount *m = real_mount(mnt);
if (beneath) {
- m = real_mount(mnt);
+ path_put(&under);
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
- dentry = dget(m->mnt_mountpoint);
+ under.mnt = mntget(&m->mnt_parent->mnt);
+ under.dentry = dget(m->mnt_mountpoint);
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
+ dentry = under.dentry;
} else {
dentry = path->dentry;
}
inode_lock(dentry->d_inode);
- if (unlikely(cant_mount(dentry))) {
- inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
- goto out;
- }
-
namespace_lock();
- if (beneath && (!is_mounted(mnt) || m->mnt_mountpoint != dentry)) {
+ if (unlikely(cant_mount(dentry) || !is_mounted(mnt)))
+ break; // not to be mounted on
+
+ if (beneath && unlikely(m->mnt_mountpoint != dentry ||
+ &m->mnt_parent->mnt != under.mnt)) {
namespace_unlock();
inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
- goto out;
+ continue; // got moved
}
mnt = lookup_mnt(path);
- if (likely(!mnt))
+ if (unlikely(mnt)) {
+ namespace_unlock();
+ inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
+ path_put(path);
+ path->mnt = mnt;
+ path->dentry = dget(mnt->mnt_root);
+ continue; // got overmounted
+ }
+ mp = get_mountpoint(dentry);
+ if (IS_ERR(mp))
break;
-
- namespace_unlock();
- inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
- if (beneath)
- dput(dentry);
- path_put(path);
- path->mnt = mnt;
- path->dentry = dget(mnt->mnt_root);
- }
-
- mp = get_mountpoint(dentry);
- if (IS_ERR(mp)) {
- namespace_unlock();
- inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
+ if (beneath) {
+ /*
+ * @under duplicates the references that will stay
+ * at least until namespace_unlock(), so the path_put()
+ * below is safe (and OK to do under namespace_lock -
+ * we are not dropping the final references here).
+ */
+ path_put(&under);
+ }
+ return mp;
}
-
-out:
+ namespace_unlock();
+ inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
if (beneath)
- dput(dentry);
-
+ path_put(&under);
return mp;
}
@@ -2892,9 +2898,9 @@ static void unlock_mount(struct mountpoint *where)
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
put_mountpoint(where);
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
+ inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
namespace_unlock();
- inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
}
static int graft_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct mount *p, struct mountpoint *mp)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-22 3:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-21 3:35 [PATCH][RFC] ->mnt_devname is never NULL Al Viro
2025-04-21 7:56 ` Christian Brauner
2025-04-21 16:29 ` Al Viro
2025-04-21 17:03 ` Al Viro
2025-04-22 3:14 ` Al Viro [this message]
2025-04-22 7:47 ` [PATCH][RFC] do_lock_mount() races in 'beneath' case Christian Brauner
2025-04-22 7:43 ` [PATCH][RFC] ->mnt_devname is never NULL Christian Brauner
2025-04-22 7:31 ` Christian Brauner
2025-04-22 12:25 ` Al Viro
2025-04-22 13:40 ` Christian Brauner
2025-04-23 1:30 ` Al Viro
2025-04-23 22:20 ` Al Viro
2025-04-24 8:56 ` Christian Brauner
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