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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] __legitimize_mnt(): check for MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT should be under mount_lock
Date: Thu, 8 May 2025 21:00:53 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250508200053.GD2023217@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250508195916.GC2023217@ZenIV>

... or we risk stealing final mntput from sync umount - raising mnt_count
after umount(2) has verified that victim is not busy, but before it
has set MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT; in that case __legitimize_mnt() doesn't see
that it's safe to quietly undo mnt_count increment and leaves dropping
the reference to caller, where it'll be a full-blown mntput().

Check under mount_lock is needed; leaving the current one done before
taking that makes no sense - it's nowhere near common enough to bother
with.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 fs/namespace.c | 6 +-----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 98a5cd756e9a..eba4748388b1 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -790,12 +790,8 @@ int __legitimize_mnt(struct vfsmount *bastard, unsigned seq)
 	smp_mb();			// see mntput_no_expire()
 	if (likely(!read_seqretry(&mount_lock, seq)))
 		return 0;
-	if (bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT) {
-		mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
-		return 1;
-	}
 	lock_mount_hash();
-	if (unlikely(bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_DOOMED)) {
+	if (unlikely(bastard->mnt_flags & (MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT | MNT_DOOMED))) {
 		mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
 		unlock_mount_hash();
 		return 1;
-- 
2.39.5


  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-08 20:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-28  6:30 [RFC] move_mount(2): still breakage around new mount detection Al Viro
2025-04-28  7:03 ` Al Viro
2025-04-28  8:50   ` Christian Brauner
2025-04-28 18:53     ` Al Viro
2025-04-29  4:03       ` Al Viro
2025-04-29  5:10         ` Al Viro
2025-04-29  5:27           ` Al Viro
2025-04-29  8:21           ` Christian Brauner
2025-05-05  5:08           ` Al Viro
2025-05-05 14:20             ` Christian Brauner
2025-04-29  7:56         ` Christian Brauner
2025-04-29 12:27           ` Al Viro
2025-04-29  7:52       ` Christian Brauner
2025-05-08  5:56       ` more breakage there (was Re: [RFC] move_mount(2): still breakage around new mount detection) Al Viro
2025-05-08 19:59         ` Al Viro
2025-05-08 20:00           ` Al Viro [this message]
2025-05-09 11:02             ` [PATCH 1/4] __legitimize_mnt(): check for MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT should be under mount_lock Christian Brauner
2025-05-08 20:01           ` [PATCH 2/4] do_umount(): add missing barrier before refcount checks in sync case Al Viro
2025-05-09 11:02             ` Christian Brauner
2025-05-08 20:02           ` [PATCH 3/4] do_move_mount(): don't leak MNTNS_PROPAGATING on failures Al Viro
2025-05-08 20:03             ` reproducer for "do_move_mount(): don't leak MNTNS_PROPAGATING on failures" Al Viro
2025-05-09 11:02             ` [PATCH 3/4] do_move_mount(): don't leak MNTNS_PROPAGATING on failures Christian Brauner
2025-05-13 11:03             ` Lai, Yi
2025-05-13 12:08               ` Al Viro
2025-05-13 14:33                 ` Lai, Yi
2025-05-08 20:02           ` [PATCH 4/4] fix IS_MNT_PROPAGATING uses Al Viro
2025-05-08 20:04             ` reproducer for "fix IS_MNT_PROPAGATING uses" Al Viro
2025-05-09 11:01             ` [PATCH 4/4] fix IS_MNT_PROPAGATING uses Christian Brauner
2025-05-09 11:06         ` more breakage there (was Re: [RFC] move_mount(2): still breakage around new mount detection) Christian Brauner

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