From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
"Andre Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2025 17:20:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250622172043.3fb0e54c@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1750585239.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
On Sun, 22 Jun 2025 11:52:38 +0200
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> wrote:
> Masked user access avoids the address/size verification by access_ok().
> Allthough its main purpose is to skip the speculation in the
> verification of user address and size hence avoid the need of spec
> mitigation, it also has the advantage to reduce the amount of
> instructions needed so it also benefits to platforms that don't
> need speculation mitigation, especially when the size of the copy is
> not know at build time.
It also removes a conditional branch that is quite likely to be
statically predicted 'the wrong way'.
> Unlike x86_64 which masks the address to 'all bits set' when the
> user address is invalid, here the address is set to an address in
> the gap. It avoids relying on the zero page to catch offseted
> accesses. On book3s/32 it makes sure the opening remains on user
> segment. The overcost is a single instruction in the masking.
That isn't true (any more).
Linus changed the check to (approx):
if (uaddr > TASK_SIZE)
uaddr = TASK_SIZE;
(Implemented with a conditional move)
Replacing the original version that used cmp, sbb, or to get 'all bits set'.
Quite likely the comments are wrong!
I thought there was a second architecture that implemented it - and might
still set ~0u?
As you noted returning 'TASK_SIZE' (or, at least, the base of a page that
is guaranteed to fault) means that the caller only has to do 'reasonably
sequential' accesses, and not guarantee to read offset zero first.
As a separate patch, provided there is a guard page between user and kernel,
and user accesses are 'reasonably sequential' even access_ok() need not
check the transfer length. Linus wasn't that brave :-)
I think some of the 'API' is still based on the original 386 code where
the page tables had to be checked by hand for CoW.
David
>
> First patch adds masked_user_read_access_begin() and
> masked_user_write_access_begin() to match with user_read_access_end()
> and user_write_access_end().
>
> Second patch adds speculation barrier to copy_from_user_iter() so that
> the barrier in powerpc raw_copy_from_user() which is redundant with
> the one in copy_from_user() can be removed.
>
> Third patch removes the redundant barrier_nospec() in
> raw_copy_from_user().
>
> Fourth patch removes the unused size parameter when enabling/disabling
> user access.
>
> Last patch implements masked user access.
>
> Christophe Leroy (5):
> uaccess: Add masked_user_{read/write}_access_begin
> uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user_iter()
> powerpc: Remove unused size parametre to KUAP enabling/disabling
> functions
> powerpc: Move barrier_nospec() out of allow_read_{from/write}_user()
> powerpc: Implement masked user access
>
> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +-
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/kup.h | 2 +-
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup.h | 4 +-
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h | 24 ++--
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/kup-8xx.h | 2 +-
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/kup-booke.h | 2 +-
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 140 ++++++++++++++++---
> fs/select.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/uaccess.h | 8 ++
> kernel/futex/futex.h | 4 +-
> lib/iov_iter.c | 7 +
> lib/strncpy_from_user.c | 2 +-
> lib/strnlen_user.c | 2 +-
> 13 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-22 16:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-22 9:52 [PATCH 0/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 1/5] uaccess: Add masked_user_{read/write}_access_begin Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 16:35 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 5:34 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 2/5] uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user_iter() Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 16:52 ` David Laight
2025-06-22 16:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-06-22 20:18 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 5:49 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-24 8:07 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 15:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 3/5] powerpc: Remove unused size parametre to KUAP enabling/disabling functions Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 4/5] powerpc: Move barrier_nospec() out of allow_read_{from/write}_user() Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 5/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 17:13 ` David Laight
2025-06-22 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-06-22 19:51 ` David Laight
2025-06-22 18:57 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-22 16:20 ` David Laight [this message]
2025-06-24 5:27 ` [PATCH 0/5] " Christophe Leroy
2025-06-24 8:32 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 21:37 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-25 8:30 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 13:17 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-24 16:50 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 18:25 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-24 21:08 ` David Laight
2025-06-26 5:56 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-26 22:01 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-07-05 10:55 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-07-05 11:42 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-07-05 18:33 ` David Laight
2025-07-05 20:15 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-07-05 21:05 ` David Laight
2025-07-05 21:37 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-26 21:39 ` Segher Boessenkool
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