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From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>,
	Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Andre Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2025 17:20:43 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250622172043.3fb0e54c@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1750585239.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>

On Sun, 22 Jun 2025 11:52:38 +0200
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> wrote:

> Masked user access avoids the address/size verification by access_ok().
> Allthough its main purpose is to skip the speculation in the
> verification of user address and size hence avoid the need of spec
> mitigation, it also has the advantage to reduce the amount of
> instructions needed so it also benefits to platforms that don't
> need speculation mitigation, especially when the size of the copy is
> not know at build time.

It also removes a conditional branch that is quite likely to be
statically predicted 'the wrong way'.

> Unlike x86_64 which masks the address to 'all bits set' when the
> user address is invalid, here the address is set to an address in
> the gap. It avoids relying on the zero page to catch offseted
> accesses. On book3s/32 it makes sure the opening remains on user
> segment. The overcost is a single instruction in the masking.

That isn't true (any more).
Linus changed the check to (approx):
	if (uaddr > TASK_SIZE)
		uaddr = TASK_SIZE;
(Implemented with a conditional move)
Replacing the original version that used cmp, sbb, or to get 'all bits set'.
Quite likely the comments are wrong!

I thought there was a second architecture that implemented it - and might
still set ~0u?
As you noted returning 'TASK_SIZE' (or, at least, the base of a page that
is guaranteed to fault) means that the caller only has to do 'reasonably
sequential' accesses, and not guarantee to read offset zero first.

As a separate patch, provided there is a guard page between user and kernel,
and user accesses are 'reasonably sequential' even access_ok() need not
check the transfer length. Linus wasn't that brave :-)

I think some of the 'API' is still based on the original 386 code where
the page tables had to be checked by hand for CoW.

	David

> 
> First patch adds masked_user_read_access_begin() and
> masked_user_write_access_begin() to match with user_read_access_end()
> and user_write_access_end().
> 
> Second patch adds speculation barrier to copy_from_user_iter() so that
> the barrier in powerpc raw_copy_from_user() which is redundant with
> the one in copy_from_user() can be removed.
> 
> Third patch removes the redundant barrier_nospec() in
> raw_copy_from_user().
> 
> Fourth patch removes the unused size parameter when enabling/disabling
> user access.
> 
> Last patch implements masked user access.
> 
> Christophe Leroy (5):
>   uaccess: Add masked_user_{read/write}_access_begin
>   uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user_iter()
>   powerpc: Remove unused size parametre to KUAP enabling/disabling
>     functions
>   powerpc: Move barrier_nospec() out of allow_read_{from/write}_user()
>   powerpc: Implement masked user access
> 
>  arch/powerpc/Kconfig                         |   2 +-
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/kup.h     |   2 +-
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup.h     |   4 +-
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h               |  24 ++--
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/kup-8xx.h |   2 +-
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/kup-booke.h  |   2 +-
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h           | 140 ++++++++++++++++---
>  fs/select.c                                  |   2 +-
>  include/linux/uaccess.h                      |   8 ++
>  kernel/futex/futex.h                         |   4 +-
>  lib/iov_iter.c                               |   7 +
>  lib/strncpy_from_user.c                      |   2 +-
>  lib/strnlen_user.c                           |   2 +-
>  13 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-06-22 16:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-22  9:52 [PATCH 0/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22  9:52 ` [PATCH 1/5] uaccess: Add masked_user_{read/write}_access_begin Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 16:35   ` David Laight
2025-06-24  5:34     ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22  9:52 ` [PATCH 2/5] uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user_iter() Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 16:52   ` David Laight
2025-06-22 16:57   ` Linus Torvalds
2025-06-22 20:18     ` David Laight
2025-06-24  5:49     ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-24  8:07       ` David Laight
2025-06-24 15:15       ` Linus Torvalds
2025-06-22  9:52 ` [PATCH 3/5] powerpc: Remove unused size parametre to KUAP enabling/disabling functions Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22  9:52 ` [PATCH 4/5] powerpc: Move barrier_nospec() out of allow_read_{from/write}_user() Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22  9:52 ` [PATCH 5/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 17:13   ` David Laight
2025-06-22 17:40     ` Linus Torvalds
2025-06-22 19:51       ` David Laight
2025-06-22 18:57     ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-22 16:20 ` David Laight [this message]
2025-06-24  5:27   ` [PATCH 0/5] " Christophe Leroy
2025-06-24  8:32     ` David Laight
2025-06-24 21:37       ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-25  8:30         ` David Laight
2025-06-24 13:17     ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-24 16:50       ` David Laight
2025-06-24 18:25         ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-24 21:08           ` David Laight
2025-06-26  5:56             ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-26 22:01               ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-07-05 10:55                 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-07-05 11:42                   ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-07-05 18:33                 ` David Laight
2025-07-05 20:15                   ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-07-05 21:05                     ` David Laight
2025-07-05 21:37                       ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-26 21:39             ` Segher Boessenkool

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