From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: patches@lists.linux.dev, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>,
Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] hfsplus: return EIO when type of hidden directory mismatch in hfsplus_fill_super()
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2025 11:29:51 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251002153025.2209281-4-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251002153025.2209281-1-sashal@kernel.org>
From: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
[ Upstream commit 9282bc905f0949fab8cf86c0f620ca988761254c ]
If Catalog File contains corrupted record for the case of
hidden directory's type, regard it as I/O error instead of
Invalid argument.
Signed-off-by: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250805165905.3390154-1-frank.li@vivo.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
Based on my extensive analysis, here is my comprehensive assessment:
## Backport Status: YES
## Detailed Analysis
### 1. Historical Context
Through git history analysis, I discovered that the `-EINVAL` error code
was introduced in **2018 by Tetsuo Handa** (commit 7464726cb5998) to fix
a critical syzbot-reported bug where `hfsplus_fill_super()` was
returning 0 (success) when detecting invalid filesystem images, causing
NULL pointer dereferences. The choice of `-EINVAL` was somewhat
arbitrary—the primary goal was to return *any* error instead of 0.
### 2. What This Commit Fixes
This commit corrects the error semantics at fs/hfsplus/super.c:527,
changing from `-EINVAL` to `-EIO` when the hidden directory's catalog
entry has an incorrect type (not `HFSPLUS_FOLDER`). This is filesystem
metadata corruption, not invalid user input.
### 3. Code Pattern Analysis
Examining the HFS+ codebase reveals a clear pattern:
- **-EIO usage**: 27+ instances across super.c, btree.c, xattr.c, dir.c,
catalog.c, etc., consistently used for on-disk corruption
- **-EINVAL usage**: Used for invalid mount options (options.c) and
invalid user-provided arguments
- **Line 527 was the exception**: It incorrectly used `-EINVAL` for what
is clearly filesystem corruption
This pattern is consistent with other filesystems: NILFS2 extensively
documents "`-EIO` - I/O error (including metadata corruption)" while
reserving `-EINVAL` for invalid arguments.
### 4. Backport Suitability Assessment
**Strongly Suitable:**
- ✅ **Semantic correctness fix**: Aligns error handling with established
kernel patterns
- ✅ **Minimal risk**: Single-line change affecting only error code
returned
- ✅ **No functional changes**: Doesn't alter any logic, just error
semantics
- ✅ **Improves consistency**: Brings this code in line with rest of HFS+
subsystem
- ✅ **Benefits users**: More accurate error reporting for corrupted
filesystems
- ✅ **Already reviewed**: Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko (HFS+
maintainer)
- ✅ **No architectural changes**: Confined to error handling
- ✅ **No user-space dependencies**: Mount utilities don't depend on
specific error codes
### 5. Evidence of Active Backporting
The commit has **ALREADY been backported** to stable trees:
- Commit 22017d3bff896 shows `[ Upstream commit
9282bc905f0949fab8cf86c0f620ca988761254c ]`
- Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin for stable tree inclusion
- CommitDate: Sep 30, 2025 (present in linux-autosel-6.17-2)
### 6. Context Within Broader HFS+ Hardening
Recent HFS+ commits show active efforts to improve robustness against
corrupted/malicious filesystem images:
- Multiple KMSAN uninit-value fixes
- Slab-out-of-bounds fixes
- Removal of BUG_ON() in favor of graceful error handling
- Validation improvements for record offsets
This commit is part of that broader hardening effort.
### 7. Risk Assessment
**Regression Risk: MINIMAL**
- Only changes the errno value returned during mount failure
- User-space tools (mount, fsck.hfsplus) display different error
messages but behavior is unchanged
- No security implications—both error codes indicate mount failure
- Cannot affect successfully mounted filesystems
**Recommendation:** This commit should be backported to all maintained
stable kernels where the original `-EINVAL` code exists (approximately
since Linux 2.6.x, but practically important for kernels 4.x+).
fs/hfsplus/super.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/super.c b/fs/hfsplus/super.c
index 2f215d1daf6d9..77ec048021a01 100644
--- a/fs/hfsplus/super.c
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/super.c
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static int hfsplus_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
if (!hfs_brec_read(&fd, &entry, sizeof(entry))) {
hfs_find_exit(&fd);
if (entry.type != cpu_to_be16(HFSPLUS_FOLDER)) {
- err = -EINVAL;
+ err = -EIO;
goto out_put_root;
}
inode = hfsplus_iget(sb, be32_to_cpu(entry.folder.id));
--
2.51.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-10-02 15:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-02 15:29 [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] hfs: fix KMSAN uninit-value issue in hfs_find_set_zero_bits() Sasha Levin
2025-10-02 15:29 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] hfs: clear offset and space out of valid records in b-tree node Sasha Levin
2025-10-02 15:29 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2025-10-02 15:30 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] hfsplus: fix KMSAN uninit-value issue in hfsplus_delete_cat() Sasha Levin
2025-10-02 15:30 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] exec: Fix incorrect type for ret Sasha Levin
2025-10-02 15:30 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] hfsplus: fix KMSAN uninit-value issue in __hfsplus_ext_cache_extent() Sasha Levin
2025-10-02 15:30 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] hfs: make proper initalization of struct hfs_find_data Sasha Levin
2025-10-02 15:30 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in hfsplus_strcasecmp() Sasha Levin
2025-10-02 15:30 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] hfs: validate record offset in hfsplus_bmap_alloc Sasha Levin
2025-10-02 15:30 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-6.12] binfmt_elf: preserve original ELF e_flags for core dumps Sasha Levin
2025-10-02 15:58 ` Kees Cook
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