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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"kernel test robot" <lkp@intel.com>,
	"Russell King" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Madhavan Srinivasan" <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Michael Ellerman" <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"Nicholas Piggin" <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	"Christophe Leroy" <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, "Paul Walmsley" <pjw@kernel.org>,
	"Palmer Dabbelt" <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	"Heiko Carstens" <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Sven Schnelle" <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Julia Lawall" <Julia.Lawall@inria.fr>,
	"Nicolas Palix" <nicolas.palix@imag.fr>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Darren Hart" <dvhart@infradead.org>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"André Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [patch V3 02/12] uaccess: Provide ASM GOTO safe wrappers for unsafe_*_user()
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2025 12:08:58 +0200 (CEST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251017093029.938477880@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20251017085938.150569636@linutronix.de

ASM GOTO is miscompiled by GCC when it is used inside a auto cleanup scope:

bool foo(u32 __user *p, u32 val)
{
	scoped_guard(pagefault)
		unsafe_put_user(val, p, efault);
	return true;
efault:
	return false;
}

 e80:	e8 00 00 00 00       	call   e85 <foo+0x5>
 e85:	65 48 8b 05 00 00 00 00 mov    %gs:0x0(%rip),%rax
 e8d:	83 80 04 14 00 00 01 	addl   $0x1,0x1404(%rax)   // pf_disable++
 e94:	89 37                	mov    %esi,(%rdi)
 e96:	83 a8 04 14 00 00 01 	subl   $0x1,0x1404(%rax)   // pf_disable--
 e9d:	b8 01 00 00 00       	mov    $0x1,%eax           // success
 ea2:	e9 00 00 00 00       	jmp    ea7 <foo+0x27>      // ret
 ea7:	31 c0                	xor    %eax,%eax           // fail
 ea9:	e9 00 00 00 00       	jmp    eae <foo+0x2e>      // ret

which is broken as it leaks the pagefault disable counter on failure.

Clang at least fails the build.

Linus suggested to add a local label into the macro scope and let that
jump to the actual caller supplied error label.

       	__label__ local_label;                                  \
        arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, local_label);              \
	if (0) {                                                \
	local_label:                                            \
		goto label;                                     \

That works for both GCC and clang.

clang:

 c80:	0f 1f 44 00 00       	   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)	
 c85:	65 48 8b 0c 25 00 00 00 00 mov    %gs:0x0,%rcx
 c8e:	ff 81 04 14 00 00    	   incl   0x1404(%rcx)	   // pf_disable++
 c94:	31 c0                	   xor    %eax,%eax        // set retval to false
 c96:	89 37                      mov    %esi,(%rdi)      // write
 c98:	b0 01                	   mov    $0x1,%al         // set retval to true
 c9a:	ff 89 04 14 00 00    	   decl   0x1404(%rcx)     // pf_disable--
 ca0:	2e e9 00 00 00 00    	   cs jmp ca6 <foo+0x26>   // ret

The exception table entry points correctly to c9a

GCC:

 f70:   e8 00 00 00 00          call   f75 <baz+0x5>
 f75:   65 48 8b 05 00 00 00 00 mov    %gs:0x0(%rip),%rax
 f7d:   83 80 04 14 00 00 01    addl   $0x1,0x1404(%rax)  // pf_disable++
 f84:   8b 17                   mov    (%rdi),%edx
 f86:   89 16                   mov    %edx,(%rsi)
 f88:   83 a8 04 14 00 00 01    subl   $0x1,0x1404(%rax) // pf_disable--
 f8f:   b8 01 00 00 00          mov    $0x1,%eax         // success
 f94:   e9 00 00 00 00          jmp    f99 <baz+0x29>    // ret
 f99:   83 a8 04 14 00 00 01    subl   $0x1,0x1404(%rax) // pf_disable--
 fa0:   31 c0                   xor    %eax,%eax         // fail
 fa2:   e9 00 00 00 00          jmp    fa7 <baz+0x37>    // ret

The exception table entry points correctly to f99

So both compilers optimize out the extra goto and emit correct and
efficient code.

Provide a generic wrapper to do that to avoid modifying all the affected
architecture specific implementation with that workaround.

The only change required for architectures is to rename unsafe_*_user() to
arch_unsafe_*_user(). That's done in subsequent changes.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
 include/linux/uaccess.h |   72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
+++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
@@ -518,7 +518,34 @@ long strncpy_from_user_nofault(char *dst
 		long count);
 long strnlen_user_nofault(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count);
 
-#ifndef __get_kernel_nofault
+#ifdef arch_get_kernel_nofault
+/*
+ * Wrap the architecture implementation so that @label can be outside of a
+ * cleanup() scope. A regular C goto works correctly, but ASM goto does
+ * not. Clang rejects such an attempt, but GCC silently emits buggy code.
+ */
+#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label)		\
+do {								\
+	__label__ local_label;					\
+	arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, local_label);	\
+	if (0) {						\
+	local_label:						\
+		goto label;					\
+	}							\
+} while (0)
+
+#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label)		\
+do {								\
+	__label__ local_label;					\
+	arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, local_label);	\
+	if (0) {						\
+	local_label:						\
+		goto label;					\
+	}							\
+} while (0)
+
+#elif !defined(__get_kernel_nofault) /* arch_get_kernel_nofault */
+
 #define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label)	\
 do {							\
 	type __user *p = (type __force __user *)(src);	\
@@ -535,7 +562,8 @@ do {							\
 	if (__put_user(data, p))			\
 		goto label;				\
 } while (0)
-#endif
+
+#endif  /* !__get_kernel_nofault */
 
 /**
  * get_kernel_nofault(): safely attempt to read from a location
@@ -549,7 +577,42 @@ do {							\
 	copy_from_kernel_nofault(&(val), __gk_ptr, sizeof(val));\
 })
 
-#ifndef user_access_begin
+#ifdef user_access_begin
+
+#ifdef arch_unsafe_get_user
+/*
+ * Wrap the architecture implementation so that @label can be outside of a
+ * cleanup() scope. A regular C goto works correctly, but ASM goto does
+ * not. Clang rejects such an attempt, but GCC silently emits buggy code.
+ *
+ * Some architectures use internal local labels already, but this extra
+ * indirection here is harmless because the compiler optimizes it out
+ * completely in any case. This construct just ensures that the ASM GOTO
+ * target is always in the local scope. The C goto 'label' works correct
+ * when leaving a cleanup() scope.
+ */
+#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label)			\
+do {							\
+	__label__ local_label;				\
+	arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, local_label);	\
+	if (0) {					\
+	local_label:					\
+		goto label;				\
+	}						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label)			\
+do {							\
+	__label__ local_label;				\
+	arch_unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, local_label);	\
+	if (0) {					\
+	local_label:					\
+		goto label;				\
+	}						\
+} while (0)
+#endif /* arch_unsafe_get_user */
+
+#else /* user_access_begin */
 #define user_access_begin(ptr,len) access_ok(ptr, len)
 #define user_access_end() do { } while (0)
 #define unsafe_op_wrap(op, err) do { if (unlikely(op)) goto err; } while (0)
@@ -559,7 +622,8 @@ do {							\
 #define unsafe_copy_from_user(d,s,l,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__copy_from_user(d,s,l),e)
 static inline unsigned long user_access_save(void) { return 0UL; }
 static inline void user_access_restore(unsigned long flags) { }
-#endif
+#endif /* !user_access_begin */
+
 #ifndef user_write_access_begin
 #define user_write_access_begin user_access_begin
 #define user_write_access_end user_access_end


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-10-17 10:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-17 10:08 [patch V3 00/12] uaccess: Provide and use scopes for user masked access Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:08 ` [patch V3 01/12] ARM: uaccess: Implement missing __get_user_asm_dword() Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 12:36   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2025-10-17 10:08 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2025-10-17 12:43   ` [patch V3 02/12] uaccess: Provide ASM GOTO safe wrappers for unsafe_*_user() Mathieu Desnoyers
2025-10-17 12:48     ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 03/12] x86/uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 04/12] powerpc/uaccess: " Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 05/12] riscv/uaccess: " Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 06/12] s390/uaccess: " Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 07/12] uaccess: Provide scoped masked user access regions Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 11:08   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-10-17 11:21     ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 11:29       ` Andrew Cooper
2025-10-17 11:25     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-17 13:23   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2025-10-20 18:28   ` David Laight
2025-10-21 14:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-21 14:42       ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-21 20:52         ` David Laight
2025-10-21 14:44       ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-21 15:06       ` Linus Torvalds
2025-10-21 15:45         ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-21 15:51           ` Linus Torvalds
2025-10-21 18:55       ` David Laight
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 08/12] uaccess: Provide put/get_user_masked() Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 13:41   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2025-10-17 13:45     ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2025-10-20  6:50       ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 09/12] [RFC] coccinelle: misc: Add scoped_masked_$MODE_access() checker script Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:51   ` Julia Lawall
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 10/12] futex: Convert to scoped masked user access Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 11/12] x86/futex: " Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 13:37   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-10-17 10:09 ` [patch V3 12/12] select: " Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:35   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-17 11:12     ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-10-17 10:37 ` [patch V3 00/12] uaccess: Provide and use scopes for user masked access Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-17 10:50   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-10-17 12:25 ` Mathieu Desnoyers

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