[RFC PATCH] fs/pidfs: Add permission check to pidfd_info()

[danieldurning.work@gmail.com]

From: Daniel Durning <danieldurning.work@gmail.com>

Added a permission check to pidfd_info(). Originally, process info
could be retrieved with a pidfd even if proc was mounted with hidepid
enabled, allowing pidfds to be used to bypass those protections. We
now call ptrace_may_access() to perform some DAC checking as well
as call the appropriate LSM hook.

The downside to this approach is that there are now more restrictions
on accessing this info from a pidfd than when just using proc (without
hidepid). I am open to suggestions if anyone can think of a better way
to handle this.

I have also noticed that it is possible to use pidfds to poll on any
process regardless of whether the process is a child of the caller,
has a different UID, or has a different security context. Is this
also worth addressing? If so, what exactly should the DAC checks be?

Signed-off-by: Daniel Durning <danieldurning.work@gmail.com>
---
 fs/pidfs.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/pidfs.c b/fs/pidfs.c
index dba703d4ce4a..058a7d798bca 100644
--- a/fs/pidfs.c
+++ b/fs/pidfs.c
@@ -365,6 +365,13 @@ static long pidfd_info(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		goto copy_out;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Do a filesystem cred ptrace check to verify access
+	 * to the task's info.
+	 */
+	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	c = get_task_cred(task);
 	if (!c)
 		return -ESRCH;
-- 
2.52.0