From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Werner Almesberger <werner@almesberger.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC] pivot_root(2) races
Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2026 06:34:54 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260209063454.GI3183987@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=whoVEhWbBJK9SiA0XoUbyurn9gN8O0gUAne88a4gXDLyQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Sun, Feb 08, 2026 at 09:49:40PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sun, 8 Feb 2026 at 16:32, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> >
> > AFAICS, the original rationale had been about the kernel threads
> > that would otherwise keep the old root busy.
>
> I don't think it was even about just kernel threads, it was about the
> fact that pivot_root was done early, but after other user space things
> could have been started.
>
> Of course, now it's used much more widely than the original "handle
> initial root switching in user space"
>
> > Unfortunately, the way it's been done (all the way since the
> > original posting) is racy. If pivot_root() is called while another
> > thread is in the middle of fork(), it will not see the fs_struct of
> > the child to be.
>
> I think that what is much more serious than races is the *non*racy behavior.
>
> Maybe I'm missing something, but it looks like anybody can just switch
> things around for _other_ namespaces if they have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
> _their_ namespace. It's just using may_mount()", which i sabout the
> permission to modify the locall namespace.
>
> I probably am missing something, and just took a very quick look, and
> am missing some check for "only change processes we have permission to
> change".
Not really - look at those check_mnt() in pivot_root(2).
static inline int check_mnt(const struct mount *mnt)
{
return mnt->mnt_ns == current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
const char __user *, put_old)
{
...
if (!check_mnt(root_mnt) || !check_mnt(new_mnt))
return -EINVAL;
IOW, try to do that to another namespace and you'll get -EINVAL,
no matter what permissions you might have in your namespace
(or globally, for that matter).
may_mount() check is "if you don't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in your namespace,
you are not getting anywhere at all"; check_mount() ones - "... and
it would better be your namespace you are about to change"
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-09 6:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-09 0:34 [RFC] pivot_root(2) races Al Viro
2026-02-09 5:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-09 5:53 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-09 6:34 ` Al Viro [this message]
2026-02-09 6:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-09 11:53 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-12 17:17 ` Askar Safin
2026-02-12 19:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-12 19:31 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-13 9:51 ` Aleksa Sarai
2026-02-13 17:47 ` Askar Safin
2026-02-13 20:27 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-13 20:35 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-13 22:25 ` Al Viro
2026-02-13 23:00 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-13 23:41 ` Al Viro
2026-02-13 23:40 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-14 12:42 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-15 0:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-17 8:37 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-14 16:20 ` Askar Safin
2026-02-15 0:49 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-13 13:46 ` Aleksa Sarai
2026-02-13 15:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-13 17:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-13 18:27 ` Askar Safin
2026-02-13 18:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-13 20:00 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-14 15:31 ` Askar Safin
2026-02-15 0:52 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-14 12:15 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-14 16:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-14 17:40 ` Al Viro
2026-02-17 8:35 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-13 18:42 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-13 20:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-12 19:22 ` Al Viro
2026-02-13 17:34 ` Askar Safin
2026-02-13 22:28 ` Al Viro
2026-02-14 16:16 ` Askar Safin
2026-02-12 13:23 ` Askar Safin
2026-02-12 19:25 ` Al Viro
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