From: "Theodore Tso" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 2/4] pidfd: add CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 08:29:54 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260218132954.GA45984@macsyma-wired.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wiPJfnTVq6vUF8K8kF0FfrY2svAqSwsL8xLEV76pVyEkg@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Feb 17, 2026 at 03:44:52PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Feb 2026 at 15:38, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > You can already send SIGHUP to such binaries through things like job
> > control, right?
>
> But at least those can be blocked, and people can disassociate
> themselves from a tty if they care etc.
Does CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL need to send a SIGKILL? Could it be
something that could be trapped/blocked, like SIGHUP or SIGTERM? Or
maybe we could do the SIGHUP, wait 30 seconds (+/- a random delay), if
it hasn't exited, send SIGTERM, wait another 30 seconds (+/- a random
delay) if it hasn't exited send a SIGKILL. That's still a change in
the security model, but it's less likely to cause problems if the goal
is to try to catch a setuid program while it is in the middle of
editing some critical file such as /etc/sudo.conf or /etc/passwd or
some such.
I bet we'll still see some zero days coming out of this, but we can at
least mitigate likelihood of security breach.
- Ted
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-18 13:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-17 22:35 [PATCH RFC v3 0/4] pidfd: add CLONE_AUTOREAP and CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:35 ` [PATCH RFC v3 1/4] clone: add CLONE_AUTOREAP Christian Brauner
2026-02-18 11:25 ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-02-18 13:30 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:35 ` [PATCH RFC v3 2/4] pidfd: add CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 23:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-17 23:38 ` Jann Horn
2026-02-17 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-18 8:18 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-18 14:00 ` Theodore Tso
2026-02-18 13:29 ` Theodore Tso [this message]
2026-02-18 10:21 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 23:43 ` Jann Horn
2026-02-18 10:00 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-18 11:50 ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-02-18 13:31 ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:35 ` [PATCH RFC v3 3/4] selftests/pidfd: add CLONE_AUTOREAP tests Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:35 ` [PATCH RFC v3 4/4] selftests/pidfd: add CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL tests Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:46 ` [PATCH RFC v3 0/4] pidfd: add CLONE_AUTOREAP and CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL Christian Brauner
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260218132954.GA45984@macsyma-wired.lan \
--to=tytso@mit.edu \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox