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From: "Theodore Tso" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 2/4] pidfd: add CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 08:29:54 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260218132954.GA45984@macsyma-wired.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wiPJfnTVq6vUF8K8kF0FfrY2svAqSwsL8xLEV76pVyEkg@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Feb 17, 2026 at 03:44:52PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Feb 2026 at 15:38, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > You can already send SIGHUP to such binaries through things like job
> > control, right?
> 
> But at least those can be blocked, and people can disassociate
> themselves from a tty if they care etc.

Does CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL need to send a SIGKILL?  Could it be
something that could be trapped/blocked, like SIGHUP or SIGTERM?  Or
maybe we could do the SIGHUP, wait 30 seconds (+/- a random delay), if
it hasn't exited, send SIGTERM, wait another 30 seconds (+/- a random
delay) if it hasn't exited send a SIGKILL.  That's still a change in
the security model, but it's less likely to cause problems if the goal
is to try to catch a setuid program while it is in the middle of
editing some critical file such as /etc/sudo.conf or /etc/passwd or
some such.

I bet we'll still see some zero days coming out of this, but we can at
least mitigate likelihood of security breach.

							- Ted
							

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-02-18 13:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-17 22:35 [PATCH RFC v3 0/4] pidfd: add CLONE_AUTOREAP and CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:35 ` [PATCH RFC v3 1/4] clone: add CLONE_AUTOREAP Christian Brauner
2026-02-18 11:25   ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-02-18 13:30     ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:35 ` [PATCH RFC v3 2/4] pidfd: add CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 23:17   ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-17 23:38     ` Jann Horn
2026-02-17 23:44       ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-18  8:18         ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-18 14:00           ` Theodore Tso
2026-02-18 13:29         ` Theodore Tso [this message]
2026-02-18 10:21       ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 23:43   ` Jann Horn
2026-02-18 10:00     ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-18 11:50   ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-02-18 13:31     ` Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:35 ` [PATCH RFC v3 3/4] selftests/pidfd: add CLONE_AUTOREAP tests Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:35 ` [PATCH RFC v3 4/4] selftests/pidfd: add CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL tests Christian Brauner
2026-02-17 22:46 ` [PATCH RFC v3 0/4] pidfd: add CLONE_AUTOREAP and CLONE_PIDFD_AUTOKILL Christian Brauner

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