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From: david.laight.linux@gmail.com
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andre Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
	"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
	Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
	David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@inria.fr>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	Nicolas Palix <nicolas.palix@imag.fr>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 next 5/5] signal: Use scoped_user_access() instead of __put/get_user()
Date: Mon,  2 Mar 2026 13:27:55 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260302132755.1475451-6-david.laight.linux@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260302132755.1475451-1-david.laight.linux@gmail.com>

From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>

Mechanically change the access_ok() and __get/put_user() to use
scoped_user_read/write_access() and unsafe_get/put_user().

This generates better code with fewer STAC/CLAC pairs.

It also ensures that access_ok() is called near the user accesses.
I failed to find the one for __save_altstack().

Looking at the change, perhaps there should be aliases:
#define scoped_put_user unsafe_put_user
#define scoped_get_user unsafe_get_user

Signed-off-by: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/signal.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index d65d0fe24bfb..fca257398cbc 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -4469,10 +4469,16 @@ int restore_altstack(const stack_t __user *uss)
 int __save_altstack(stack_t __user *uss, unsigned long sp)
 {
 	struct task_struct *t = current;
-	int err = __put_user((void __user *)t->sas_ss_sp, &uss->ss_sp) |
-		__put_user(t->sas_ss_flags, &uss->ss_flags) |
-		__put_user(t->sas_ss_size, &uss->ss_size);
-	return err;
+
+	scoped_user_write_access(uss, Efault) {
+		unsafe_put_user((void __user *)t->sas_ss_sp, &uss->ss_sp, Efault);
+		unsafe_put_user(t->sas_ss_flags, &uss->ss_flags, Efault);
+		unsafe_put_user(t->sas_ss_size, &uss->ss_size, Efault);
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+Efault:
+	return -EFAULT;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
@@ -4705,12 +4711,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigaction, int, sig,
 
 	if (act) {
 		old_sigset_t mask;
-		if (!access_ok(act, sizeof(*act)) ||
-		    __get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_handler, &act->sa_handler) ||
-		    __get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_restorer, &act->sa_restorer) ||
-		    __get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_flags, &act->sa_flags) ||
-		    __get_user(mask, &act->sa_mask))
-			return -EFAULT;
+		scoped_user_read_access(act, Efault) {
+		    unsafe_get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_handler, &act->sa_handler, Efault);
+		    unsafe_get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_restorer, &act->sa_restorer, Efault);
+		    unsafe_get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_flags, &act->sa_flags, Efault);
+		    unsafe_get_user(mask, &act->sa_mask, Efault);
+		}
 #ifdef __ARCH_HAS_KA_RESTORER
 		new_ka.ka_restorer = NULL;
 #endif
@@ -4720,15 +4726,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigaction, int, sig,
 	ret = do_sigaction(sig, act ? &new_ka : NULL, oact ? &old_ka : NULL);
 
 	if (!ret && oact) {
-		if (!access_ok(oact, sizeof(*oact)) ||
-		    __put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_handler, &oact->sa_handler) ||
-		    __put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_restorer, &oact->sa_restorer) ||
-		    __put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_flags, &oact->sa_flags) ||
-		    __put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_mask.sig[0], &oact->sa_mask))
-			return -EFAULT;
+		scoped_user_write_access(oact, Efault) {
+		    unsafe_put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_handler, &oact->sa_handler, Efault);
+		    unsafe_put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_restorer, &oact->sa_restorer, Efault);
+		    unsafe_put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_flags, &oact->sa_flags, Efault);
+		    unsafe_put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_mask.sig[0], &oact->sa_mask, Efault);
+		}
 	}
 
 	return ret;
+
+Efault:
+	return -EFAULT;
 }
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION
@@ -4742,12 +4751,12 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigaction, int, sig,
 	compat_uptr_t handler, restorer;
 
 	if (act) {
-		if (!access_ok(act, sizeof(*act)) ||
-		    __get_user(handler, &act->sa_handler) ||
-		    __get_user(restorer, &act->sa_restorer) ||
-		    __get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_flags, &act->sa_flags) ||
-		    __get_user(mask, &act->sa_mask))
-			return -EFAULT;
+		scoped_user_read_access(act, Efault) {
+		    unsafe_get_user(handler, &act->sa_handler, Efault);
+		    unsafe_get_user(restorer, &act->sa_restorer, Efault);
+		    unsafe_get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_flags, &act->sa_flags, Efault);
+		    unsafe_get_user(mask, &act->sa_mask, Efault);
+		}
 
 #ifdef __ARCH_HAS_KA_RESTORER
 		new_ka.ka_restorer = NULL;
@@ -4760,16 +4769,19 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigaction, int, sig,
 	ret = do_sigaction(sig, act ? &new_ka : NULL, oact ? &old_ka : NULL);
 
 	if (!ret && oact) {
-		if (!access_ok(oact, sizeof(*oact)) ||
-		    __put_user(ptr_to_compat(old_ka.sa.sa_handler),
-			       &oact->sa_handler) ||
-		    __put_user(ptr_to_compat(old_ka.sa.sa_restorer),
-			       &oact->sa_restorer) ||
-		    __put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_flags, &oact->sa_flags) ||
-		    __put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_mask.sig[0], &oact->sa_mask))
-			return -EFAULT;
+		scoped_user_write_access(oact, Efault) {
+		    unsafe_put_user(ptr_to_compat(old_ka.sa.sa_handler),
+			       &oact->sa_handler, Efault);
+		    unsafe_put_user(ptr_to_compat(old_ka.sa.sa_restorer),
+			       &oact->sa_restorer, Efault);
+		    unsafe_put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_flags, &oact->sa_flags, Efault);
+		    unsafe_put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_mask.sig[0], &oact->sa_mask, Efault);
+		}
 	}
 	return ret;
+
+Efault:
+	return -EFAULT;
 }
 #endif
 
-- 
2.39.5


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-02 13:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-02 13:27 [PATCH v2 0/5] uaccess: Updates to scoped_user_access() david.laight.linux
2026-03-02 13:27 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] uaccess: Fix scoped_user_read_access() for 'pointer to const' david.laight.linux
2026-03-02 14:59   ` Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)
2026-03-02 17:26     ` Linus Torvalds
2026-03-02 18:55       ` David Laight
2026-03-02 13:27 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] compiler.h: Add generic support for 'autoterminating nested for() loops' david.laight.linux
2026-03-02 13:27 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] uaccess.h: Use with() and and_with() in __scoped_user_access() david.laight.linux
2026-03-02 13:27 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] uaccess: Disable -Wshadow " david.laight.linux
2026-03-02 15:00   ` Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)
2026-03-03  9:12     ` David Laight
2026-03-02 17:17   ` Linus Torvalds
2026-03-05  8:10   ` kernel test robot
2026-03-02 13:27 ` david.laight.linux [this message]
2026-03-02 16:07   ` [PATCH v2 next 5/5] signal: Use scoped_user_access() instead of __put/get_user() Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)

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