From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Nicolas Bouchinet" <nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>,
"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] security: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 13:31:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260325-filmverleih-auffressen-e897fcf8d3f2@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260312100444.2609563-2-mic@digikod.net>
On Thu, Mar 12, 2026 at 11:04:34AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
>
> All namespace types now share the same ns_common infrastructure. Extend
> this to include a security blob so LSMs can start managing namespaces
> uniformly without having to add one-off hooks or security fields to
> every individual namespace type.
>
> Add a ns_security pointer to ns_common and the corresponding lbs_ns
> blob size to lsm_blob_sizes. Allocation and freeing hooks are called
> from the common __ns_common_init() and __ns_common_free() paths so
> every namespace type gets covered in one go. All information about the
> namespace type and the appropriate casting helpers to get at the
> containing namespace are available via ns_common making it
> straightforward for LSMs to differentiate when they need to.
>
> A namespace_install hook is called from validate_ns() during setns(2)
> giving LSMs a chance to enforce policy on namespace transitions.
>
> Individual namespace types can still have their own specialized security
> hooks when needed. This is just the common baseline that makes it easy
> to track and manage namespaces from the security side without requiring
> every namespace type to reinvent the wheel.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260216-work-security-namespace-v1-1-075c28758e1f@kernel.org
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h | 3 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 20 ++++++++
> kernel/nscommon.c | 12 +++++
> kernel/nsproxy.c | 8 +++-
> security/lsm_init.c | 2 +
> security/security.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 8 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 8c42b4bde09c..fefd3aa6d8f4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOSYS, task_prctl, int option, unsigned long arg2,
> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_to_inode, struct task_struct *p,
> struct inode *inode)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, userns_create, const struct cred *cred)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_alloc, struct ns_common *ns)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, namespace_free, struct ns_common *ns)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_install, const struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ipc_permission, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getlsmprop, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
> struct lsm_prop *prop)
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index d48bf0ad26f4..3e7afe76e86c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
> unsigned int lbs_ipc;
> unsigned int lbs_key;
> unsigned int lbs_msg_msg;
> + unsigned int lbs_ns;
> unsigned int lbs_perf_event;
> unsigned int lbs_task;
> unsigned int lbs_xattr_count; /* num xattr slots in new_xattrs array */
> diff --git a/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h b/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
> index 0014fbc1c626..170288e2e895 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
> @@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ struct ns_common {
> struct dentry *stashed;
> const struct proc_ns_operations *ops;
> unsigned int inum;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> + void *ns_security;
> +#endif
> union {
> struct ns_tree;
> struct rcu_head ns_rcu;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 83a646d72f6f..611b9098367d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ enum fs_value_type;
> struct watch;
> struct watch_notification;
> struct lsm_ctx;
> +struct nsset;
>
> /* Default (no) options for the capable function */
> #define CAP_OPT_NONE 0x0
> @@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx;
>
> struct ctl_table;
> struct audit_krule;
> +struct ns_common;
> struct user_namespace;
> struct timezone;
>
> @@ -533,6 +535,9 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
> void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
> int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred);
> +int security_namespace_alloc(struct ns_common *ns);
> +void security_namespace_free(struct ns_common *ns);
> +int security_namespace_install(const struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns);
> int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
> void security_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_prop *prop);
> int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
> @@ -1407,6 +1412,21 @@ static inline int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline int security_namespace_alloc(struct ns_common *ns)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void security_namespace_free(struct ns_common *ns)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_namespace_install(const struct nsset *nsset,
> + struct ns_common *ns)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
> short flag)
> {
> diff --git a/kernel/nscommon.c b/kernel/nscommon.c
> index bdc3c86231d3..de774e374f9d 100644
> --- a/kernel/nscommon.c
> +++ b/kernel/nscommon.c
> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
> #include <linux/ns_common.h>
> #include <linux/nstree.h>
> #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
> #include <linux/vfsdebug.h>
>
> @@ -59,6 +60,9 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
>
> refcount_set(&ns->__ns_ref, 1);
> ns->stashed = NULL;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> + ns->ns_security = NULL;
> +#endif
> ns->ops = ops;
> ns->ns_id = 0;
> ns->ns_type = ns_type;
> @@ -77,6 +81,13 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
> ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->inum);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> +
> + ret = security_namespace_alloc(ns);
> + if (ret) {
> + proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
ret = security_namespace_alloc(ns);
if (ret && !inum)
proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
return ret;
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> /*
> * Tree ref starts at 0. It's incremented when namespace enters
> * active use (installed in nsproxy) and decremented when all
> @@ -91,6 +102,7 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
>
> void __ns_common_free(struct ns_common *ns)
> {
> + security_namespace_free(ns);
> proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
> }
>
> diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> index 259c4b4f1eeb..f0b30d1907e7 100644
> --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
> +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> @@ -379,7 +379,13 @@ static int prepare_nsset(unsigned flags, struct nsset *nsset)
>
> static inline int validate_ns(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns)
> {
> - return ns->ops->install(nsset, ns);
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = ns->ops->install(nsset, ns);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + return security_namespace_install(nsset, ns);
In my local tree I had that moved before the ->install() and I think
that's the correct thing to do. So please switch to that.
The rest looks good to me, thanks.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-25 12:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-12 10:04 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] Landlock: Namespace and capability control Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] security: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-25 12:31 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] security: Add LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NS for namespace audit records Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-25 12:32 ` Christian Brauner
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] nsproxy: Add FOR_EACH_NS_TYPE() X-macro and CLONE_NS_ALL Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-25 12:33 ` Christian Brauner
2026-03-25 15:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-26 14:22 ` (subset) " Christian Brauner
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] landlock: Wrap per-layer access masks in struct layer_rights Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] landlock: Enforce namespace entry restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] landlock: Enforce capability restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] selftests/landlock: Drain stale audit records on init Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-24 13:27 ` Günther Noack
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] selftests/landlock: Add namespace restriction tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] selftests/landlock: Add capability " Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] samples/landlock: Add capability and namespace restriction support Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-12 10:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] landlock: Add documentation for capability and namespace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-12 14:48 ` Justin Suess
2026-03-25 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] Landlock: Namespace and capability control Christian Brauner
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260325-filmverleih-auffressen-e897fcf8d3f2@brauner \
--to=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=enlightened@google.com \
--cc=gnoack@google.com \
--cc=ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com \
--cc=kernel-team@cloudflare.com \
--cc=lennart@poettering.net \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=m@maowtm.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=utilityemal77@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox