Re: [RFC PATCH] userfaultfd: allow registration of ranges below mmap_min_addr

Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-04-09T07:58:59Z

On Thu, Apr 09, 2026 at 11:51:11AM +0900, Harry Yoo (Oracle) wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 08, 2026 at 11:09:00AM +0300, Denis M. Karpov wrote:
> > > Hmm but it looks bit strange to check capability for address that is
> > > already mapped by mmap(). Why is this required?
> >
> > Actually, it's not obvious to me either, but I may miss something.
> > My intent was to replace the current restrictive check with a more flexible one.
>
> Technically, it's less restrictive only if start < mmap_min_addr
> (setting aside the discussion of whether this is an appropriate check).
>
> Otherwise (start >= mmap_min_addr) it's more restrictive? (now, the process
> should have the capability when registering an existing VMA to userfaultfd)
>
> > I think performing this check here allows us to deny invalid requests early,
> > before locks or VMA lookups occur.
>
> But we're not trying to optimize it and we shouldn't add checks without
> a proper explanation for the sake of optimization.

Duplicating this kind of logic in the already horribly duplicative (and more
generally, horrible) UFFD implementation is actively buggy and incorrect IMO.

I also find it extremely odd that we are validating that a... source
address... is... mapped that way (in userfaultfd_copy(), we validate
uffdio_copy.src using validate_unaligned_range(), as well as the destination via
validate_range()).

It just makes no sense to me at all.

Let's get rid of it.

>
> > Removing this check entirely would also allow using UFFD in cases where a task
> > drops privileges after the initial mmap(). This seems reasonable because the
> > VMA already exists, i.e. kernel already allowed this mapping.
>
> Yeah, that seems reasonable to me.
>
> IOW, I don't think "creating a VMA on a specific address (w/ proper
> capabilities) is okay but once it is registered to userfaultfd,
> it becomes a security hole" is a valid argument.

Yes.

>
> And we don't unmap those mappings when the process loses the capability
> to map them anyway.

Once it's mapped it's mapped...?

>
> > In the [BUG] thread discussion
>
> Was it a private discussion? I can't find Andrea's emails on the thread.
>
> > Andrea Arcangeli also suggested adding a check for
> > FIRST_USER_ADDRESS to handle architectural constraints.
>
> Again, what's the point of checking this on the VMA that is already created?
> *checks why FIRST_USER_ADDRESS was introduced*

Yeah this is just the exact same thing with a different thing to compare
against no?

copy_from_user() will handle this in mfill_copy_folio_locked(), returning an
error if a user tried to copy from somewhere they shouldn't have (the same way
as if the user tried to copy from somewhere else they shouldn't have).

Let's not block on off-list sidebars.

>
> commit e2cdef8c847b480529b7e26991926aab4be008e6
> Author: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
> Date: Tue Apr 19 13:29:19 2005 -0700
>
> [PATCH] freepgt: free_pgtables from FIRST_USER_ADDRESS
>
> The patches to free_pgtables by vma left problems on any architectures which
> leave some user address page table entries unencapsulated by vma. Andi has
> fixed the 32-bit vDSO on x86_64 to use a vma. Now fix arm (and arm26), whose
> first PAGE_SIZE is reserved (perhaps) for machine vectors.
>
> Our calls to free_pgtables must not touch that area, and exit_mmap's
> BUG_ON(nr_ptes) must allow that arm's get_pgd_slow may (or may not) have
> allocated an extra page table, which its free_pgd_slow would free later.
>
> FIRST_USER_PGD_NR has misled me and others: until all the arches define
> FIRST_USER_ADDRESS instead, a hack in mmap.c to derive one from t'other. This
> patch fixes the bugs, the remaining patches just clean it up.
>
> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
>
> Oh, ok. there might be a raw mapping without VMA below FIRST_USER_ADDRESS.
>
> Adding such a check wouldn't hurt... but if there is no VMA, you can't
> register the range to userfaultfd anyway?

Exactly... and I don't want to see us randomly do checks that already happened
previously.

Putting duplicated bitrot-baiting code in what is one of the worst areas of
mm is not something I want us to do, and would like us to actively remove
anything that already exists like this.

And the fact that this is in an fs/ file is even more annoying to me. Really I
don't think _any_ meaningful uffd logic belongs there. Especially since we have
a bunch of other uffd crap in mm/userfaultfd.c.

The fs/userfaultfd.c file should be a bare-bones thing that handles the fs side
of uffd _only_.

Cheers, Lorenzo